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Abstract 
This study compared the performance of 27 previously depressed and 21 never-
depressed participants on a divided visual field task designed to examine the 
lateralization of emotional processing.  Participants were asked to make judgments of 
emotional valence (positive or negative) for laterally presented words preceded by a 
centrally presented prime.  Previous studies using this paradigm have found support 
for an enduring negativistic verbal processing bias in the right hemisphere among 
both depressed and previously depressed individuals.  The present study represents an 
attempt to address several remaining questions regarding this phenomenon; 
specifically, this study aims to help clarify the respective roles of present mood state, 
anxious symptomatology, and prior depressive experience in giving rise to the 
aforementioned verbal processing bias.  Participants in both diagnostic groups 
demonstrated an unusually large bias for words presented to the left hemisphere, such 
that their ability to accurately judge words presented to the right hemisphere was 
seriously compromised.  Consequently, all participants who evidenced accuracy 
judgments for right hemisphere-presented words that were not significantly better 
than chance were excluded from further divided visual field analyses.  The remaining 
23 participants demonstrated a right visual field (left hemisphere) advantage for all 
words, and a valence-priming advantage for negative words.  There were no 
significant differences between diagnostic groups, and no significant findings related 
to mood state for any of the divided visual field study variables, however, this was 
not unexpected given the limited power associated with this smaller sample of 
  
 
iv 
 
participants.  A number of hypotheses to account for the poor accuracy rates on this 
task – particularly for the right hemisphere – are discussed.  Additionally, there was 
some evidence to suggest that the sad mood state associated with the mood induction 
may not have endured for participants, and implications for future research are 
discussed. 
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Divided Visual Field Study of Depression, Cognition, and Mood 
Approximately 20 million American adults experience depressive illness each 
year (Young, Weinberger, Beck, 2001).  Because as many as 80% of previously 
depressed individuals will eventually relapse (Judd, 1997), considerable research 
attention has been accorded to the identification of factors that confer heightened 
vulnerability to depression recurrence.  Moreover, research that increases our 
understanding of cognitive vulnerability in depression should provide new insights 
for diagnosis and treatment of depression.  Therefore, this research is not only of 
theoretical importance for a better understanding of cognition in depression, but it 
could also have significant practical implications in the future. 
Cognitive vulnerability to depression 
 Cognitive theories have enhanced our understanding of depression by 
identifying a potential mechanism for vulnerability.  Such theories stress the 
etiological role of dysfunctional cognitions (e.g., negative beliefs and information 
processing patterns) in the development and maintenance of depression (Beck, 1976, 
1987).  Beck’s influential cognitive model emphasizes the role of schemas, 
conceptualized as cognitive structures containing information stored in memory.  
Schemas function as cognitive templates that facilitate the screening and evaluation 
of incoming information.  Although everyone has schemas, Beck suggests that those 
of depressed individuals are rigid and negative.  Specifically, Beck’s cognitive model 
proposes that depression is characterized by dysfunctional beliefs (schemas) about the 
self, the world, and the future – a constellation referred to as the “cognitive triad” 
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(Beck, 1970).  The depressed person’s schemas tend to reflect a view of the self as 
worthless, the world as filled with obstacles that are overwhelming and impossible to 
overcome, and the future as hopeless (Beck & Clark, 1988).  These dysfunctional 
beliefs, in turn, bring about pervasive information processing biases in depression that 
encompass perception, attention, and memory.   
Before we examine the empirical support for the proposed etiological role of 
dysfunctional cognitions (e.g., schemas, information processing patterns) in 
depression, it may be useful to consider a taxonomy proposed by Ingram and Kendall 
(1986) for organizing and understanding various cognitive constructs.  According to 
this taxonomy, cognitive variables may be categorized as the structure, proposition, 
operation, or product of the information-processing system.  The structure refers to 
the organization of internally stored information, comprised of the propositions or 
content (e.g., “I’m worthless.”).  Taken together, the structure and propositions make 
up the schema described by Beck (and, therefore, direct screening, encoding, and 
evaluation of information).  Operations refer to the actual cognitive processes 
responsible for screening and encoding incoming information, as well as the retrieval 
of memories (e.g., information processes such as attentional and memory processes).  
Finally, products are the thoughts, decisions, and images that arise from the 
interaction of schemas with incoming information that is processed (e.g., automatic 
thoughts such as, “I must be stupid because I failed my exam”). 
Empirical support for the existence of dysfunctional beliefs (propositions or 
schematic content) and automatic thoughts (products) in depression is strong among 
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currently depressed individuals (reviewed in Haaga, Dyck & Ernst, 1991).  
Furthermore, depressed individuals generally process information (operations) in the 
environment with a negative bias by selectively attending to and remembering 
negatively toned information (reviewed in Gotlib & Neubauer, 2000; Haaga et al.).  
The evidence for a causal role of dysfunctional cognitions (e.g., propositions, 
operations, or products) in depression, however, is less clear (reviewed in Barnett & 
Gotlib, 1988; Ilardi & Craighead, 1999).   For example, many researchers have 
argued that if dysfunctional cognitions play a causal role in the development of 
depression, such cognitions should be detectable (at some level of analysis) in 
previously depressed individuals, who are typically quite vulnerable to the experience 
of future episodes (Judd, 1997; Ingram, Miranda, & Segal, 1998).  However, 
frequently utilized techniques for assessing dysfunctional beliefs (e.g., self-report 
measures such as the Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale, DAS, Weissman & Beck, 1988), 
and automatic thoughts (e.g., Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire, Hollon & Kendall, 
1980) often fail to detect these dysfunctional cognitions in previously depressed, 
euthymic individuals (reviewed in Barnett & Gotlib, 1988; Haaga et al., 1991; Ilardi 
& Craighead, 1999).  Furthermore, research that looks at information processing 
patterns in depression does not usually provide evidence for dysfunctional 
information processing patterns (e.g., operations such as memory or attentional biases 
for negative information) in previously depressed individuals in the absence of a sad 
mood (reviewed in Gotlib & Neubauer, 2000).  The inability to detect dysfunctional 
cognitions (at any level of cognitive analysis) in previously depressed individuals in 
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the absence of a sad mood, however, does not prove that dysfunctional cognitions 
lack a causal role in the development and maintenance of depression.  In fact, Beck 
(1987) has reemphasized that the cognitive model of depression suggests 
dysfunctional cognitions (particularly core beliefs or propositions) interact with stress 
in depression and, therefore, these cognitions may be latent until activated by a 
stressful life event. 
Mood Priming and Cognitive Reactivity 
Consistent with Beck’s reemphasis on the interactive nature of dysfunctional 
cognitions and stress in depression, several researchers have examined the 
relationship between depressive cognition and current mood state, guided by the 
premise that maladaptive schemas (propositions) remain latent until reactivated by 
negative life events (e.g., Beck, 1987; Miranda & Persons, 1988).  According to this 
cognitive reactivity model, dysfunctional cognitions (e.g., propositions, operations, 
and products) should be undetectable in vulnerable individuals until activated by 
stress that leads to a depressed mood or a temporary sad mood that increases the 
accessibility of these cognitions (Miranda & Persons; Ingram, Miranda, & Segal, 
1998).  Studies that have investigated the cognitive reactivity model have typically 
employed mood induction procedures to bring about a temporary sad mood, and have 
generally provided support for it (e.g., Ingram, Bernet & McLaughlin, 1994; 
Williams, 1988, as cited in Ingram et al., 1998; Segal, Gemar, & Williams, 1999).  
These studies mostly find that previously depressed, while in a sad mood state, 
individuals exhibit dysfunctional cognitions (e.g., beliefs/propositions, information 
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processing patterns or operations) that are not observed among never-depressed 
individuals in a sad mood.  Notably, however, a few studies have not provided 
support for the cognitive reactivity hypothesis (e.g., Blackburn & Smyth, 1985; 
Dykman, 1997, as cited in Ingram et al., 1998; Gotlib & Cane, 1987).   
Studies investigating the cognitive reactivity model for depression usually 
assess dysfunctional cognitions in previously depressed and never-depressed 
individuals before sad mood priming and then reassess dysfunctional cognitions 
following mood priming procedures.  For example, in a study by Teasdale and Dent 
(1987), the authors initially found no reliable differences between previously 
depressed and never-depressed participants on an incidental recall task of self-referent 
adjectives (a task that likely assesses cognitive propositions and operations).  
Following a sad mood induction in which a temporary sad mood was primed, 
however, previously depressed participants recalled more negative adjectives that 
they had endorsed as self-descriptive compared with never-depressed participants.  
Thus, prior to mood priming, the recall performance of previously depressed 
participants was indistinguishable from never-depressed participants, and only after 
mood priming did they exhibit dysfunctional cognitions (information processing 
patterns reflective of propositions) consistent with depression.   
Miranda and Persons (1988) also examined the cognitive reactivity hypothesis 
using previously depressed and never-depressed participants.  Previously depressed 
participants did not initially report significantly elevated dysfunctional attitudes on 
the DAS (the DAS is usually regarded as a measure that taps into deeper cognitive 
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constructs such as propositions) compared with never-depressed participants.  
Following a sad mood priming procedure, however, previously depressed participants 
endorsed dysfunctional attitudes, whereas never-depressed participants did not.  
Moreover, in a subsequent study, Miranda, Persons and Byers (1990) examined the 
relationship between current mood state and dysfunctional attitudes (using the DAS) 
of previously depressed and never-depressed participants by looking at naturally 
occurring diurnal variations in mood.  They found that previously depressed 
participants had elevated DAS scores while in a naturally occurring negative mood 
state; DAS scores of never-depressed participants were not significantly related to 
diurnal variations in mood (Miranda et al., 1990).  Finally, Miranda, Gross, Persons, 
and Hahn (1998) obtained similar results, whereby previously depressed participants 
endorsed dysfunctional attitudes on the DAS following an induced temporary sad 
mood state that increased with the intensity of their sad mood.  Negative mood, 
however, was not associated with increased scores on the DAS in never-depressed 
participants (Miranda et al., 1998).   
In a study by Ingram and colleagues (1994), information processing patterns 
were examined in previously depressed and never-depressed participants.  All 
participants were first randomly assigned to either a control condition or a mood 
induction condition.  Immediately following the mood induction and control 
condition tasks, participants performed a dichotic listening task to assess attentional 
allocation (information processing patterns influenced by schematic content).  The 
task required participants to attend to a story that was presented in one ear while 
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simultaneously ignoring distractor words presented to the other ear; distractor words 
were positive and negative adjectives, and neutral nouns.  Errors for tracking the story 
served as the dependent variable used to assess attentional allocation (more errors 
reflected greater attention to distractor words).  The authors found no significant 
differences in attentional allocation between previously depressed and never-
depressed participants in the control condition.  For participants primed for a 
temporary sad mood state, however, previously depressed participants evinced greater 
attentional allocation to both positive and negative stimuli, relative to neutral stimuli 
as compared with never-depressed participants in the sad mood condition (and 
compared with both groups of participants in the control condition).  Ingram and 
Ritter (1998) used the same dichotic listening task in a subsequent study and found 
that previously depressed participants were indistinguishable from never-depressed 
participants prior to mood priming.  Following sad mood priming, however, 
previously depressed participants had increased errors for tracking the story when 
negative words were presented to the other ear.  Thus, unlike the findings from the 
earlier study, previously depressed participants showed an attentional bias that was 
specific to negative stimuli rather than emotional stimuli in general (Ingram & Ritter, 
1998).   
Hedlund and Rude (1995) examined the relationship between dysfunctional 
cognitions and depression vulnerability with the emotional Stroop task, a scrambled 
sentence task, and an incidental recall task following a self-focus induction procedure 
intended to prime a negative mood.  The emotional Stroop task is a modified version 
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of the original Stroop task, and uses adjectives associated with different emotional 
states (e.g, happy, sad).  For this task, participants are presented with words written in 
different colors, and they are required to name the color of each word (not the actual 
word) as quickly as possible.  Slowed naming of colors for specific types of words 
(e.g., depression-related) is believed to be a result of increased attention for those 
words and a resulting interference that leads to slower color-naming.  The authors 
found that in the presence of self-focused attention, there were no significant 
differences between currently depressed, previously depressed, and never-depressed 
participants on the Stroop test.  On the scrambled sentences task, however, currently 
and previously depressed participants completed significantly more negative 
sentences, and they recalled more negative self-descriptive adjectives on the 
incidental recall task compared with never-depressed participants (following the self-
focus induction).  Currently depressed participants completed significantly more 
negative sentences than previously depressed participants in the presence of self-
focused attention, but they were not reliably different from previously depressed 
participants on the recall task (Hedlund & Rude).  Thus, following a self-focused 
mood induction procedure, previously depressed participants did not reliably differ 
from currently depressed participants on tasks assessing patterns of information 
processing that are likely influenced by dysfunctional schemas (i.e., a recall task).   
Finally, Smith, Teasdale, and Cowen (1998; cited in Ingram et al., 1998), used 
a tryptophan depletion paradigm to create a biologically-induced sad mood in 
previously depressed and never-depressed women.  Previously depressed participants 
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who experienced a more severe drop in mood demonstrated more positive responses 
to measures of dysfunctional cognitions (DAS, Attributional Style Questionnaire, and 
an autobiographical memory test) than previously depressed participants who 
experienced a less severe drop in mood.  Moreover, previously depressed participants 
who experienced a more severe drop in mood also demonstrated significantly more 
positive cognitive responses on some measures than never-depressed participants in 
the presence of a biologically-induced sad mood.  The authors explained that 
previously depressed participants may attempt to consciously control their thinking 
when they experience strong shifts in mood in order to compensate for low affect, 
whereas never-depressed participants may not be as motivated to consciously control 
their thinking, however, additional studies are needed to determine whether this 
finding is reliable (Teasdale et al.; as cited in Ingram et al., 1998).  Furthermore, the 
measures used in this study may be more amenable to conscious control than tests of 
information processing patterns, which examine cognitive processes that are fast and 
outside of conscious awareness (e.g., attentional processes).  Thus, it’s possible that 
the results obtained for this study would have been different if the dysfunctional 
cognitions examined were fast and unconscious information processes. 
The great majority of studies reviewed herein are at least consistent with the 
cognitive reactivity hypothesis for depression.  Furthermore, these studies stand in 
stark contrast to the null results found in many studies (e.g., reviewed in Haaga et al., 
1991) that failed to identify dysfunctional cognitions among previously depressed 
participants in the absence of negative mood induction.  The strongest support for a 
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causal role for dysfunctional cognitions (propositions, operations, and products) in 
depression, however, comes from longitudinal studies of the cognitive reactivity 
hypothesis.  For example, Williams (1988) investigated depression vulnerability in 
undergraduate students and found that participants who recalled more negative (than 
positive) self-referent adjectives in response to a sad mood state were more likely to 
become depressed one year later.  The results suggest that cognitive reactivity in 
response to a sad mood may predict the development of a future depressive episode.  
In another longitudinal study by Beevers and Carver (2003), undergraduate students 
were recruited with varying histories of major depression.  Current levels of 
dysphoria were assessed in all participants prior to performing a dot-probe task 
designed to assess attentional allocation.  For this task, pairs of words that were either 
positive or negative were briefly presented on a computer screen and then were 
subsequently followed by a dot in the spatial location of one of the words.  
Participants were asked to indicate as quickly as possible the location of the dot 
probe.  Faster detection of the probe for specific classes of stimuli is interpreted as 
reflecting an attentional bias for such stimuli.  After completing the dot probe task, 
participants underwent a negative mood induction and then performed the dot probe 
task again.  At the follow-up session, participants completed a measure of intervening 
life stress, and level of dysphoria was also assessed.  The authors found that greater 
attention to negative stimuli on the dot probe task (i.e., faster detection of probes that 
followed negative words) following sad mood priming interacted with life stress to 
predict increases in dysphoria two months later.   
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Finally, in a longitudinal study that spanned several years, Segal and 
colleagues (1999) recruited previously depressed individuals who had undergone 
either cognitive therapy or pharmacotherapy during their most recent episode of 
depression.  The authors found that depression treatment modality (cognitive therapy 
or medication) predicted cognitive reactivity to a temporary sad mood state.  
Participants who received pharmacotherapy endorsed and increased number of 
dysfunctional attitudes (assessed with the DAS) following mood priming, whereas 
those participants who received cognitive therapy did not generally demonstrate 
cognitive reactivity.  Furthermore, this cognitive reactivity (regardless of the type of 
treatment) was predictive of depression relapse several years later; participants who 
did not respond with dysfunctional attitudes following negative mood priming were 
significantly less likely to relapse compared with participants who endorsed 
dysfunctional attitudes following the sad mood induction.  Thus, research exploring 
mood priming and cognitive reactivity suggests the existence of latent dysfunctional 
cognitions (e.g., propositions, operations, products) in depression-vulnerable 
individuals (e.g., previously depressed individuals and individuals who go on to 
develop a major depressive episode) that are uncovered during a sad mood state.   
The cognitive reactivity literature generally provides at least partial support 
for a causal role of dysfunctional cognitions in the development and maintenance of 
depression, in as much as depression-vulnerable individuals appear to respond 
differently to a sad mood than do individuals who are not vulnerable to depression 
(e.g., individuals who have never been depressed).  The longitudinal studies (Beevers 
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& Carver, 2003; Segal et al.; Williams, 1998) provide considerable support for a 
causal role of dysfunctional cognitions in the development of future depressive 
episodes in vulnerable individuals because cognitive reactivity was associated with 
subsequent development of depression (or dysphoria) in all three studies.  Many of 
the studies investigating the cognitive reactivity model, however, are not without 
methodological limitations, which raise questions regarding their implications for 
cognitive theories of depression.  For example, with the exception of a few studies 
(e.g., Beevers & Carver; Ingram et al., 1994; Segal et al., 1999), most investigations 
of the cognitive reactivity model assessed mood only immediately after mood 
priming procedures, and did not reassess mood at any other point to ensure that the 
sad mood was of equal duration among both groups of participants (previously 
depressed and never-depressed).  Thus, even though previously depressed and never-
depressed participants achieved an equally sad mood immediately following mood 
priming procedures, it remains possible that the depressed mood was not equally 
maintained by both groups.  As a result, previously depressed participants may have 
demonstrated greater dysfunctional cognitions because of a more persistent sad mood 
rather than latent dysfunctional cognitions that emerged during a sad mood.  
Accordingly, future studies investigating the cognitive reactivity hypothesis and 
depression vulnerability should include an assessment of mood following 
administration of dysfunctional cognition measures (e.g., the DAS) and/or 
performance on a cognitive task designed to evaluate information processing patterns.   
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Another methodological limitation associated with the cognitive reactivity 
literature is the fact that comorbid anxiety has not typically been assessed.  Because 
anxiety has a high rate of comorbidity with depression (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000), research that has examined the cognitions of either depressed or 
anxious participants has likely included participants with a high degree of 
symptomatology associated with both disorders (or states).  Thus, in reality, many of 
the research findings on dysfunctional cognitions (propositions, operations, and 
products) in depression and anxiety may reflect dysfunctional cognitions associated 
with both disorders or states rather than dysfunctional cognitions associated with 
“pure” depression or anxiety.  Therefore, it is important for studies to assess the 
degree of anxious and depressive symptoms in their participants so that it is clear as 
to whether any dysfunctional cognitions found, reflect those associated with 
depression, anxiety, or both disorders (or states).  Moreover, studies that have 
explicitly examined dysfunctional cognitions (propositions, operations, products) in 
individuals with depression and co-occurring anxiety have produced more complex 
results (e.g., Clark, Beck, & Stewart, 1990; Ingram, Kendall, Smith, Donnell & 
Ronan, 1987).  For example, although individuals with “pure” anxiety have not 
consistently demonstrated negative automatic thoughts (e.g., “I must be stupid 
because I failed my exam”), individuals with comorbid depression and anxiety often 
demonstrate relatively more of these thoughts than individuals with a “pure” 
depression, suggesting a complex interaction between depression and anxiety (e.g., 
Clark et al., 1990; Ingram et al., 1987). Accordingly, the current project will assess 
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for symptoms of anxiety in addition to depression to determine whether findings 
reflect dysfunctional cognitions associated with depression, anxiety, or only for 
comorbid anxiety and depression.  
Finally, findings consistent with the cognitive reactivity model do not 
preclude dysfunctional cognitions from being present in depression-vulnerable 
individuals in the absence of a sad mood state.  In fact, it remains possible that 
dysfunctional cognitions at one level of analysis (or one type of cognitive construct) 
remain detectable even in the absence of depressed mood.  Furthermore, if these 
cognitive constructs (e.g., propositions, operations, and products) are latent in 
vulnerable individuals when they are not depressed, it is reasonable to hypothesize 
that such constructs must be encoded somewhere within the brains of these 
individuals, even in the absence of a sad or depressed mood.  In this regard, a recent 
study by Atchley, Ilardi, and Enloe (2003) used a cognitive neuroscience approach 
(divided visual field) to study cognition in depression, and found evidence for 
dysfunctional cognitions (information processing patterns or operations) among 
previously depressed individuals in the absence of a sad mood state.  Moreover, a 
replication study by Atchley, Stringer, Mathias, Ilardi, & Minatrea (2005) produced 
similar findings, whereby previously depressed participants demonstrated 
dysfunctional information processing patterns with the divided visual field method in 
the absence of a sad or depressed mood.  Thus, the studies by Atchley and colleagues 
suggest that latent dysfunctional cognitions (in this case information processing 
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patterns) can be detected in vulnerable individuals in the absence of a depressed 
mood using cognitive neuroscience methods.   
Cognitive Neuroscience Approach 
 The cognitive neuroscience (CNS) perspective has been used to study how 
brain events give rise to various mental and behavioral events.  In this regard, the 
CNS approach has been used to investigate emotion by examining the relationship 
between brain activities and the way people process emotional stimuli and experience 
different emotional states.  Relevant to the current proposed study, there are two 
related but largely distinct lines of inquiry that have used the CNS perspective to 
study emotion, and have put forth different hypotheses regarding the 
neuropsychology of emotion.  The first, which is referred to as the right hemisphere 
(RH) dominance hypothesis, has focused on the processing and comprehension of 
emotional stimuli, and has found the right hemisphere to be superior to the left 
hemisphere in the processing and comprehension of emotional stimuli (e.g., Etcoff, 
1984; 1989; Tucker, Watson & Heilman, 1977).  Many of the studies providing 
support for this theory have evaluated individuals with cortical damage, and have 
found that right hemispheric damage typically impairs processing and comprehension 
of emotional stimuli such as facial expressions and tone of voice .  In contrast, left 
hemispheric damage generally does not impair these functions (Etcoff; Tucker et al.).  
Furthermore, when stimuli are presented in isolation to the cerebral hemispheres (e.g., 
using divided visual field or dichotic listening methodology), participants without 
brain damage generally demonstrate enhanced processing (i.e., greater accuracy and 
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speed) of emotional stimuli when presented to their right versus left hemisphere (e.g., 
King & Kimura, 1972; Ley & Bryden, 1982; Strauss & Moscovitch, 1981).   
The second area of research using the CNS approach to study emotion 
involves the examination of hemispheric differences in the experience of various 
emotional states, and has provided support for the valence hypothesis of emotion.  In 
this line of inquiry, the left prefrontal cortex appears to play a role in mediating the 
experience of positive emotions (e.g., euphoria) and approach-related behaviors (e.g., 
introducing yourself to a stranger), whereas the right prefrontal cortex appears to be 
important in the experience of negative emotions and withdrawal-related behaviors 
(e.g., avoiding an aversive stimulus; Davidson & Tomarken, 1989; Henriques & 
Davidson, 1991; Tucker et al., 1981).  Moreover, these lateralization effects (i.e., 
differences between the left and right hemisphere) have been found both in 
nonclinical populations and in individuals with mood disorders.  Specifically, 
individuals who have experienced negative affect or depression show greater right 
prefrontal cortex activation relative to the left prefrontal cortex as compared with 
euthymic, non-depressed individuals (Davidson & Tomarken; Henriques & 
Davidson).  Notably, this asymmetry between the hemispheres in depressed and 
temporarily sad individuals seems to be the result of reduced activation of the left 
prefrontal cortex rather than increased activity in the right prefrontal cortex 
(Davidson, 2004; Henriques & Davidson, 1991; Shagass, 1972).   
A third theory on the neuropsychology of emotion has sought to integrate the 
two aforementioned hypotheses and the research associated with each.  The 
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circumplex model of emotion was originally described by Russell (1980) and 
suggested that affect is organized based on two orthogonal dimensions (or 2 
dimensions in space), which are pleasure vs. displeasure (valence) and degree of 
arousal.  Heller (1993) subsequently attempted to integrate this conceptualization of 
emotion with neuropsychological findings on emotion.  According to Heller, the 
posterior right hemisphere is responsible for perceiving all emotion and modulating 
autonomic and behavioral arousal in emotion, whereas the anterior regions are 
significant to the experience of emotional valence (i.e., left frontal region is 
implicated in the experience of positive emotional states, and the right frontal region 
is implicated in negative emotional states).  Notably, Heller’s circumplex model of 
emotion is consistent with research supporting the right hemisphere dominance and 
valence hypotheses of emotion (e.g., Davidson & Tomarken, 1989; Etcoff, 1984; 
1989; Henriques & Davidson, 1991; Tucker, Watson & Heilman, 1977; Tucker et al., 
1981).  Thus, according to Heller’s model, the experience of depression would be 
associated with greater right anterior activation relative to left anterior activation as 
was discussed within the valence hypothesis of emotion.  Furthermore, Heller’s 
model suggests that anxious states (or anxiety) would be associated with greater 
posterior right hemisphere activation (reflecting greater arousal) relative to non-
anxious states (or individuals with relatively less anxiety), which has been supported 
by numerous research findings (e.g., Bruder et al., 1997; Davidson, 1998; Heller, 
Nitschke, Etienne, Miller, 1997). Thus, given that anxiety is frequently comorbid with 
depression, and that specific (and distinct) patterns of hemispheric activation are 
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associated with depressive and anxious states (and disorders), studies investigating 
information processing patterns in depression should assess for possible anxiety 
(heightened anxious states or anxiety disorders) to determine whether findings are 
specific to depression, or if they are associated with comorbid depression and anxiety.  
Significance of the CNS Approach to the Study of Cognitive Vulnerability in 
Depression  
Unlike traditional methods for studying emotion and mood disorders, the CNS 
perspective is distinctive for using objective measures of emotional processing and 
experience (e.g., brain activation, hemispheric differences, etc.).  Thus, the CNS 
approach has the ability to explore brain activity and cognitive processes for which 
the individual is largely unaware.  Given the high rate of depression recurrence (Judd, 
1997) and the possibility that dysfunctional cognitions (at some level of cognitive 
analysis) exist in vulnerable individuals outside of the depressed state - but remain 
hidden and difficult to detect - this approach remains a potentially viable way to tap 
latent dysfunctional cognitions that might render these individuals vulnerable to 
future depressive episodes.   
In this regard, the aforementioned study by Atchley and colleagues (2003) 
utilized CNS methods (divided visual field presentation) to investigate information 
processing patterns (operations) in currently depressed, previously depressed, and 
never-depressed individuals.  The divided visual field presentation possesses an 
advantage over central visual field presentation (used in most studies on information 
processing in depression) because it assesses functioning of the left and right 
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hemispheres separately, and therefore reduces the possibility of subtle effects within 
each hemisphere “washing out” combined effects for both hemispheres together.  
Participants in this study viewed negative or positive adjectives that were presented to 
either the left or right visual field (right or left hemisphere, respectively), and they 
were asked to indicate the valence of the adjective (negative or positive). Using the 
divided visual field method, Atchley and colleagues found evidence for a right 
hemispheric processing advantage for negatively valent self-descriptive adjectives 
among depressed and previously depressed participants (i.e., they showed greater 
accuracy and faster reaction times for detecting negative adjectives compared to 
positive adjectives when presented to the left visual field/right hemisphere) – a 
pattern not observed in never-depressed participants.  Moreover, in a subsequent 
study by Atchley and colleagues (2005), similar results were obtained; depressed and 
previously depressed participants demonstrated greater accuracy (reaction time was 
not analyzed) for negative words (compared with positive words) presented to the left 
visual field (right hemisphere).  Thus, unlike studies using self-report measures to 
assess dysfunctional beliefs (e.g., propositions, reviewed in Haaga et al., 1991), or 
central visual field presentation of stimuli (reviewed in Gotlib & Neubauer, 2000) to 
assess information processing patterns, Atchley and colleagues found evidence for 
dysfunctional information processing patterns in previously depressed individuals in 
the absence of an induced sad mood by investigating these processes in the 
hemispheres separately.   
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Atchley and colleagues (2003, 2005) interpreted their findings as consistent 
with the hypothesis that semantic networks (i.e., networks containing information 
about the meanings of words) associated with the right hemisphere are organized by 
emotional experience (e.g., depression-experience) because depression-experienced 
participants evidenced facilitated processing (faster response time) of negative words 
when they were preceded by a negative prime word compared with when negative 
words were preceded by a positive prime word (i.e., an advantage when the prime and 
target matched for valence).  The significance of this later finding to right hemisphere 
semantic structure is that it suggests a faster spread of activation for negatively valent 
word meanings – compared with positively valent word meanings - within the right 
hemisphere for depression-experienced individuals.  With a greater developed 
semantic network for negative word meanings in the right hemisphere, and therefore 
faster spreading of activation, related negative word meanings would become readily 
available much faster for depression-experienced individuals.  Moreover, because 
persistent right hemisphere biases for the processing of negatively valent emotional 
words were found in previously depressed participants (in the absence of an induced 
sad mood), the right hemisphere semantic networks may reflect an enduring marker 
of depression vulnerability in previously depressed individuals.  
However, even though Atchley and colleagues were able to detect 
dysfunctional information processing patterns in previously depressed individuals in 
the absence of an induced sad mood, their studies are not without methodological 
limitations that raise questions regarding the interpretation of their results.  One of the 
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major limitations is the fact that anxiety was not assessed in either study.  This is 
significant given that anxiety frequently co-occurs with depression, and detection of 
dysfunctional cognitions varies depending on whether participants are diagnosed with 
depression, anxiety, or co-morbid depression and anxiety (e.g., Clark et al., 1990; 
Ingram et al., 1987).  Furthermore, other studies that have investigated lateralization 
(differences between the hemispheres) of information processing patterns in 
depressed and comorbid depressed and anxious individuals have not always found 
reliable differences between individuals with comorbid depression and anxiety and 
never-depressed, non-anxious control participants (reviewed in Heller & Nitschke, 
1998).  Thus, it is important to determine whether the dysfunctional information 
processing patterns in previously depressed participants that were observed by 
Atchley and colleagues are specific to depression or are only detectable when 
depression and anxiety co-occur. 
Another major limitation associated with the studies of Atchley and 
colleagues is the fact that current mood state was not assessed (the relative absence of 
dysphoria among previously depressed participants was inferred on the basis of low 
scores on the Beck Depression Inventory).  Although the authors interpreted their 
findings as consistent with a stable, enduring bias for negative information in 
depression-vulnerable individuals (e.g., previously depressed individuals), unaffected 
by current mood state, since current mood state was not explicitly assessed, it remains 
possible that previously depressed participants were in a sad mood at the time they 
performed the divided visual field task.  If so, then the observed bias for negative 
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information (i.e., greater accuracy for information presented to the right hemisphere) 
may have been state-dependent (i.e., the bias was a result of their sad mood) rather 
than reflecting an enduring negative bias that persists in the absence of a sad mood 
state.  Moreover, because Atchley and colleagues conducted the diagnostic interview 
at the beginning of their procedure (prior to the divided visual field task), it remains a 
viable possibility that previously depressed (and currently depressed) participants 
were inadvertently primed for a sad, negative mood because they had experiences 
with depression that they were discussing with the interviewer.  Never-depressed 
participants, however, had fewer experiences with depressive symptoms to report, 
and therefore, would not likely have been primed for a sad mood by the clinical 
interview.  Thus, if previously depressed participants were experiencing a 
sad/depressed mood at the time they performed the divided visual field task, then 
Atchley and colleagues’ findings could be interpreted as reflecting a state-dependent 
bias for negatively valent information (rather than a persistent negative bias) that was 
found in depression-vulnerable individuals.  Alternatively, if previously depressed 
and never-depressed participants were both in a sad mood when they performed the 
divided visual field task (which is a possibility because mood was not assessed), then 
the findings may be consistent with the cognitive reactivity hypothesis, whereby 
dysfunctional cognitions (in this case information processing patterns) were 
reactivated by a negative mood in depression-vulnerable individuals.  Without an 
assessment of mood, however, it is impossible to discriminate between three possible 
interpretations of their findings (i.e., as an enduring negative bias in the absence of 
  
 
23 
 
sad mood, a state-dependent bias, or findings consistent with the cognitive reactivity 
hypothesis).  Thus, the current project will combine mood priming techniques and 
assessment of current mood state with the divided visual field method to help 
differentiate between these three possible interpretations of Atchley and colleagues’ 
findings.  
Summary and Relevance to the Present Study 
The research reviewed herein clearly documents the occurrence of 
dysfunctional cognitions in currently depressed individuals (reviewed in Haaga et al., 
1991 and Gotlib & Neubauer, 2000).  The evidence for dysfunctional cognitions in 
previously depressed individuals in the absence of a sad mood, or in individuals with 
varying degrees of anxious symptoms and depression, is less clear.  Preliminary 
research, however, suggests that by using research methodology that investigates 
cognitions in the hemispheres separately (e.g., divided visual field), it may be 
possible to detect latent dysfunctional information processing patterns in previously 
depressed individuals in the absence of an induced sad mood (Atchley et al., 2003; 
2005).  This finding of an apparent enduring bias for negative information (compared 
with positive information) only in the right hemisphere for previously depressed 
individuals is significant because previous research has failed to detect the presence 
of stable dysfunctional cognitions in depression in the absence of an induced sad 
mood (reviewed in Ingram et al., 1998).  To date, however, there are no published 
studies that have used the divided visual field method to study the effects of a primed 
sad mood on cognitions in previously depressed and never-depressed individuals, 
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which may prove useful for determining the significance of mood and cognitions to 
depression vulnerability.  Thus, the aim of the present study was to combine mood 
priming with the divided visual field method to tease apart the effects of a sad mood 
state and depression-experience on cognition.  Moreover, by including an assessment 
of anxiety-related symptoms, this study was designed to explore possible differences 
in the lateralization of information processing patterns between individuals with a 
more “pure” depression and individuals with depression and comorbid anxious 
symptoms using the divided visual field methodology. 
Although the methodology of the present study was not capable of directly 
resolving the question of whether dysfunctional cognitions cause depression or vice 
versa, it was designed to provide evidence of considerable relevance to this question 
by examining the interaction between current mood, depression experience, and 
anxious symptoms using what may be a more sensitive methodology (divided visual 
field as opposed to central visual field presentation) for detecting dysfunctional 
information processing patterns.  For example, if the results showed that never-
depressed individuals in a sad mood exhibit a right hemispheric bias for negative 
material similar to that of currently and previously depressed individuals, this would 
suggest that there is something about a sad mood itself that leads to dysfunctional 
information processing patterns (i.e., anyone in a sad mood would experience some 
dysfunctional cognitions).  If this were the case, previously depressed individuals 
may evidence more depressotypic cognition simply because they experience sad 
moods more often.  If, however, the results showed that sad, never-depressed 
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individuals do not demonstrate a preference for negative material in their right 
hemisphere comparable with that of depression-experienced individuals, then the 
findings would be consistent with Beck's model, which emphasizes a cognitive 
vulnerability in depression.   
Furthermore, if never-depressed and previously depressed participants’ 
performance on the divided visual field task was not significantly affected by a 
temporary sad mood (and their mood is not sad during their performance on the task 
prior to mood priming), then this would suggest that Atchley and colleagues’ 
interpretation of their findings was accurate.  Thus, the findings would provide robust 
evidence for a stable, enduring negative bias in the right hemisphere of depression-
vulnerable individuals that is not state-dependent.  Moreover, the findings would 
provide further support for the hypothesis that the right hemisphere semantic 
networks are organized by emotional experience (because a sad mood was not 
necessary to detect a bias for negative words in the right hemisphere of depression-
vulnerable individuals), and the possibility that these networks are an enduring 
marker of depression vulnerability.  Thus, by exploring the interaction between 
current mood and depression experience on the lateralization of information 
processing patterns, this study attempted to address an important theoretical question 
as to the significance of negative mood and cognition in depression vulnerability. 
Study Hypotheses 
Specific predictions for the proposed study were based on empirical findings 
and theory.   Atchley and colleagues (2003, 2005) used a similar task and, therefore, 
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predictions regarding differences between diagnostic groups on the dependent 
variables are based on those empirical findings.  Moreover, cognitive theories of 
depression suggest that depressed and depression-vulnerable individuals have greater 
access to negative information because they possess a well-developed network for 
negative information (i.e., strong associations for negative information resulting in 
more efficient processing of this information), which makes this information more 
accessible (e.g., Bower, 1981, 1987).    
   First, it was hypothesized that depression-experienced participants would 
exhibit dysfunctional information processing patterns (i.e., faster and more accurate 
processing of negative information compared with positive information) in the right 
hemisphere.  Specifically, it was predicted that depression-experienced participants 
would be faster and more accurate at judging negatively valent adjectives relative to 
positively valent adjectives, particularly when negative adjectives were preceded by 
another negative adjective (valence-priming), and never-depressed participants would 
evidence the opposite pattern of results in the right hemisphere (i.e., faster and more 
accurate at judging positively valent adjectives, especially when preceded by another 
positively valent adjective).  Second, it was predicted that sad mood priming would 
have no appreciable effect on information processing patterns in the right hemisphere 
for previously depressed or never-depressed participants (which would be consistent 
with Atchley and colleagues interpretation of their findings for a trait-like, enduring 
negative bias in depression vulnerable individuals).  Finally, in light of the remaining 
questions surrounding the significance of co-morbid anxiety to lateralized 
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dysfunctional information processing patterns in depression, no specific predictions 
were made for co-occurring anxiety. 
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Method 
Participants 
Eighty-seven undergraduate students attending the University of Kansas were 
recruited for the study in fulfillment of meeting a course requirement.  Participants 
were recruited based on pretest responses to questionnaires administered through a 
mass prescreening measure on-line.  For the prescreen measures for this study, 
students completed the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 
1996) to assess any current depressive symptoms and a brief questionnaire based on 
the diagnostic criteria enumerated in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, 4
th
 edition (DSM IV, American Psychiatric Association, 1994) for a 
current or previous Major Depressive Episode (MDE).  Based on pretest responses to 
these questionnaires, 3 tentative groups of individuals were identified.  Individuals 
who endorsed at least 5 core diagnostic criteria for a MDE and had a score of 18 or 
greater on the BDI-II were given a tentative diagnosis of “depressed.”  Individuals 
who indicated that they previously would have endorsed at least 5 core diagnostic 
criteria for a MDE (but not presently), and had a score of less than 9 on the BDI-II 
were tentatively categorized as “previously depressed.”  Individuals who endorsed 2 
or fewer diagnostic criteria for a MDE for their lifetime and a score of 9 or less on the 
BDI-II received a tentative classification of “never depressed.”  Moreover, 
individuals recruited for the study were native English-speakers and right-handed 
(according to their responses on the prescreen measure).  Screened individuals who 
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tentatively met all study criteria and met criteria for one of the aforementioned 
diagnostic groups were contacted by phone or email to participate.  
Recruited participants subsequently completed a brief screening measure 
(Inventory to Diagnose Depression, Life time version, Zimmerman & Coryell, 1987) 
to provide a probable diagnosis of depressed, previously depressed or never-
depressed.   Participants given a probable diagnosis of never-depressed were 
randomly assigned to one of two groups.  One of the never-depressed groups was 
treated like the previously depressed participants and underwent mood priming.  The 
other never-depressed group of participants did not undergo mood priming.  The 
purpose of the later group of participants was to make certain that the two word lists 
for the divided visual field task were equivalent, and that there were no significant 
fatigue or practice effects over time, and were not included in the primary study 
analyses.  All participants were administered a clinical interview (Structured Clinical 
Interview for DSM-IV Axis I Disorders, clinician version, SCID; First, Spitzer, 
Gibbon & Williams, 1996) conducted by an advanced graduate student (the first 
author) in clinical psychology to confirm their depression status.  The BDI-II was 
administered to assess depression symptom severity at the time of the study.  All 
participants who were retained for the study never met criteria for a manic or 
hypomanic episode.  Individuals who met 5 or more diagnostic criteria for a MDE, 
and had a score of 15 or higher on the BDI-II comprised the depressed group.  
Individuals who previously met 5 or more diagnostic criteria for a MDE but currently 
met 2 or fewer diagnostic criteria, and who had a score of 9 or less on the BDI-II 
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comprised the previously depressed group.  Individuals who met 2 or fewer 
diagnostic criteria for a MDE (and never met 5 or more diagnostic criteria), and who 
had a score of 9 or less on the BDI-II comprised the never-depressed groups.  
Additionally, anxiety was assessed using the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; 
Spielberger, 1968).  Twelve study participants were eliminated from all analyses 
because they did not meet study criteria.  Moreover, data for currently depressed 
participants was not analyzed because only 10 recruited study participants met criteria 
for this diagnostic group, and therefore, would have limited the power for detecting 
significant between (and within) subjects effects by including them in the analyses.   
Measures 
1.  Beck Depression Inventory-Revised (BDI-II).  A widely used self-report 
measure that assesses the severity of depressive symptoms for the last two weeks.  
The BDI-II consists of 21 items answered on a scale of 0 to 3, with totaled scores that 
range from 0 to 63.  Higher scores indicate greater depression symptom severity.  The 
BDI-II has high internal consistency, with alpha coefficients of .92 and .93 for 
psychiatric outpatients and college students respectively (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 
1996).  The BDI-II also has well-established validity for depression screening in 
clinical and non-clinical populations.  Moreover, the BDI-II correlates highly with the 
Hamilton Psychiatric Rating Scale for Depression (HRSD; Hamilton, 1960), r = .71, 
which is another widely used measure to assess depressive symptoms (Beck et al., 
1996). 
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2. The Inventory to Diagnose Depression, Lifetime Version (IDD-L; Zimmerman 
& Coryell, 1987).  The IDD-L is a 22-item self-report inventory that assesses the 
level and duration of previous depressive symptomatology; scores of 40 and above 
are indicative of a previous depressive episode (Soloman, Haaga, Brody, Kirk, & 
Friedman, 1998).  The IDD-L has comparable sensitivity and specificity to the 
Diagnostic Interview Schedule (Zimmmerman & Coryell) and good discriminant 
validity (Sakado, Sata, Uehara, Sato, & Kameda, 1996) and test-retest reliability (Sato 
et al., 1996) has been reported.  Administration to college and community samples 
has yielded a Spearman Brown split-half reliability coefficient of .90 and a Cronbach 
alpha of .92 (Zimmmerman & Coryell).  
3.   The Major Depressive Episode Screening Measure (created and used by 
Atchley et al., 2003; 2005).  It is based on the diagnostic criteria for a MDE as 
described in the DSM-IV (APA, 1994).  Participants will be given a tentative 
classification for their projected diagnosis on the basis of this screening measure and 
the BDI-II.  Reliability and validity of this brief screening measure is determined 
subsequently by diagnoses provided by the SCID for DSM-IV diagnoses, clinician 
version (First, et al., 1996).   
4. Multiple Affect Adjective Checklist-Revised (MAACL-R; Zuckerman & 
Lubin, 1985).  The MAACL-R was used in the present study to assess level of 
depressive affect within an experimental session.  The MAACL-R contains 66 
scorable adjectives, and participants are instructed to check each item that applies to 
how they feel at that moment.  For the present study, depression subscale scores were 
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used to assess participants’ negative affect following a sad mood-priming procedure.  
For the depression subscale, participants receive a point for each negative adjective 
they endorse and a point for each positive adjective that they do not endorse so that 
higher scores indicate greater depressive affect.  The MAACL has well-established 
reliability and validity data for assessing depressive affect.  The depression subscale 
of the MAACL has shown a split-half reliability coefficient of .92 (Zuckerman, 
Lubin, Vogel, & Valerius, 1964).  Moreover, the depression subscale has been shown 
to correlate highly (r=.60) with adolescents’ self-report ratings of sadness and 
depression that were based on a 5-point Likert scale (Lubin et al., 1986).   
5. Visual Analogue Scale (VAS; Grossberg & Grant, 1978).  Participants will 
rate their current mood on a VAS measuring 76 mm from center to each of two 
endpoints.  The descriptor not sad at all is located to the left of center, and very sad is 
located on the right side, with an arrow indicating increasing strength of mood 
associated with greater distance from the center.  Furthermore, the VAS for assessing 
mood has demonstrated reliability and validity (Ahearn, 1997).  Ahearn and Carroll 
(1996) investigated individuals with major depression and found that they 
demonstrated a test-retest reliability coefficient of .92 over a 30-minute period on the 
mood VAS.  Studies that have attempted to establish validity for the mood VAS have 
typically compared it with other measures of depression or negative affect. For 
example, studies that have examined individuals with major depression have largely 
found the mood VAS to correlate moderately to highly with the HRSD (Hamilton, 
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1960; as cited in Ahearn) with an average correlation coefficient of .62 across studies 
(reviewed in Ahearn). 
6. Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I Disorders, Clinician Version 
(SCID; First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 1996). It is used to provide DSM-IV 
diagnoses.  The major depression, mania, and dysthymia sections of the SCID will be 
completed for the proposed study.  The SCID uses standardized clinician-directed 
queries for relevant symptomatic domains and has shown a high level of interrater 
reliability so that it has become the “gold standard” for diagnostic classification in 
clinical research settings.  Segal et al. (1995) investigated the reliability of the SCID-I 
for providing a DSM-IV diagnosis for a MDE and found the Kappa, which corrects 
for chance agreement, to be .90, reflecting good agreement.  
7. State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, 1968).  It consists of 2 
subscales, which assess state and trait anxiety independently.  The trait scale of the 
STAI has demonstrated a test-retest reliability correlation coefficient that ranges from 
.73 to .86.  The state anxiety scale has low test-retest reliability over time, which is 
expected given that it taps a transient state of anxiety.  Moreover, it has been found 
that the state anxiety scale increases prior to surgery whereas trait anxiety remains 
relatively stable.  This finding is consistent with predictions about the nature of state 
and trait anxiety where state anxiety is expected to increase in response to physical 
threat whereas trait anxiety would be unchanging (Finney, 1985).  Only the state 
anxiety subscale was used in the present study. 
Divided Visual Field Task Apparatus and Stimuli 
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All participants performed a divided visual field (DVF) task used in previous 
studies to examine dysfunctional cognitions in depression (e.g., Atchley et al., 2003; 
Atchley, Stringer, Mathias, Ilardi & Minatrea, in press).  Stimuli for the DVF task 
were presented via an IBM compatible, Pentium-class computer with a Dell monitor 
and the E-prime program.  Participants viewed the computer screen from a chin-rest, 
which helped minimize head movement and maintained vigilance to the fixation cross 
during the DVF task (e.g., so that words to the left of the fixation cross remain in the 
left visual field).          
For this task, participants viewed prime and target word-pairs that were 
positive or negative adjectives (e.g., brave, loser).  The prime word was presented in 
the center of the screen and was followed by a target word that was presented to 
either the left or right visual field.  Participants were asked to make a valence 
judgment for the target word.  The adjectives that made up the prime and target word-
pairs were balanced for word length and production frequency (Kucera & Francis, 
1967) and varied according to valence (positive vs. negative) based on previous 
norming research (Affective Norms for English Words:  Bradley & Lang, 1999).  
Level of arousal produced by the words was controlled for by only using words with 
a moderate level of arousal (eliminating extremes) based on previous norming 
research (Bradley & Lang).  On some trials, the prime and target word-pair were 
related and matched in terms of valence (e.g., brave followed by strong), whereas on 
other trials the prime and target word-pair were unrelated and did not match (e.g., 
brave followed by loser).  The rationale for using a prime word followed by a target 
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word was to improve sensitivity of the task for detecting differences in accuracy and 
reaction time within a hemisphere.  This is important because, regardless of mood, the 
left hemisphere will tend to be superior at this task because participants are being 
asked to read words (a verbal task for which the left hemisphere is superior; Banich, 
1997).  By using a prime, however, a comparison between related an unrelated trials 
can be made within a hemisphere.   
Following a practice session consisting of 30 prime-target pairs, each 
participant was presented with 4 blocks of trials for the DVF task.  Additionally, each 
block began with 4 practice trials (i.e., practice word pairs), and was followed by 96 
trials that comprised the experiment.  The first 2 experimental blocks consisted of 
words that were identical but were presented to a different visual field (e.g., 
“enraged” was presented to the left visual field in block 1 and the right visual field in 
block 2).  A single trial for the DVF task consisted of a fixation cross, followed by a 
centrally presented prime word, followed by a flash mask (a series of number signs as 
an object mask).  The flash mask was followed by a target word that was presented to 
only one visual field (left or right) and followed by another flash mask.  Given that 
the participants performed the DVF task twice (in 2 blocks), once prior to mood 
induction or sham induction procedures and once following the induction procedures, 
two separate word lists (word list 1 and 2) were used.  The adjectives that made up 
the two word lists (consisting of prime and targets adjectives) were matched for word 
length, production frequency, and valence (Kucera & Francis, 1967) based on 
previous norming research (Affective Norms for English Words:  Bradley & Lang, 
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1999).  Moreover, level of arousal produced by the words was controlled for by only 
using words with a moderate level of arousal based on previous norming research 
(Bradley & Lang).  Finally, the two words lists were counterbalanced (to minimize 
order effects) so that some participants received word list 1 first, whereas other 
participants received word list 2 first.     
Procedure 
As discussed earlier, participants were recruited based on pretest responses to 
questionnaires administered through a mass prescreening measure on-line.  At the 
study, participants completed a brief screening measure (IDD-L) to provide a 
probable diagnosis of depressed, previously depressed or never-depressed.  
Participants given a probable diagnosis of never-depressed were randomly assigned to 
one of two groups (one group underwent sad mood priming, the other group 
experienced a sham induction).  Following the brief screening measure, participants 
performed the DVF task.  Instructions were provided both visually (on the computer 
screen) and orally.  Participants were instructed to attend to the fixation cross in the 
center of the screen and then read the prime word to themselves that followed the 
fixation cross.  Moreover, the instructions informed participants that if they missed 
many of the targets, it is likely because they are shifting their gaze and they should, 
therefore, maintain focus on the fixation cross (presented central visual field).  For the 
target words (presented to only one visual field), they were asked to make a valence 
judgment (i.e., determine whether the target is positive or negative) as quickly and 
accurately as possible by pressing a key on the computer with their right hand 
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(valence of words was determined with previous norming research, Bradley & Lang, 
1999).  Following the participant’s response, feedback was provided (i.e., they were 
informed as to whether their response was correct, incorrect, or whether no response 
was detected).  Participants were provided feedback to help them improve their 
accuracy on the task.  By informing them when they are missing many targets, they 
are implicitly reminded to focus on the fixation cross rather than shift their gaze from 
one visual field to the other (suggested by the instructions).  Completion of the 
practice block and first experimental block of the DVF task was followed with a brief 
assessment of mood using the VAS before participants began Block 2 for the task 
(same wordlist, but words were flipped in terms of visual field presentation). 
Once the first two blocks of the DVF task (same list presented twice, but 
visual field presentation for targets was counterbalanced) was completed, previously 
depressed participants and one of the never-depressed groups of participants (i.e., the 
mood induction never-depressed participant group) underwent a sad mood induction 
procedure that has been used extensively in previous studies and has elicited a 
comparable sad mood in both groups (e.g., Ingram et al., 1994).  The mood induction 
procedure combined a music induction and an autobiographical induction.  The music 
induction used sad and nostalgic music played from the soundtrack for A Field of 
Dreams and the music was played continuously for 8 minutes.  While participants 
listened to the music they were instructed to think about the saddest event in their 
lives.  Currently depressed individuals did not undergo the mood induction procedure 
for ethical reasons.  The other group of never-depressed participants also did not 
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undergo the mood induction procedure.  These participant groups (depressed and the 
second never-depressed group) underwent a sham induction instead, which required 
that they listen to recorded tones and count these tones for the duration of 8 minutes.  
Following the induction procedures, all participants were administered the MAACL 
and VAS.  These measures were used to confirm the sad-mood inducing effects of the 
mood induction procedure and to ensure that both groups (previously depressed and 
never-depressed mood induction groups) achieved the sad mood equally.  
All participants performed the DVF task a second time (using the word list 
that was not used during the first DVF task administration) following the induction 
procedures.  Following the first experimental block of the DVF task, the VAS was 
administered to ensure that the effects of the mood induction procedure remained.  
Finally, at the conclusion of the DVF task (completion of fourth block), the MAACL 
and VAS were re-administered to ensure that the sad mood was maintained equally 
by both groups.  Depressed participants and never-depressed participants who do not 
undergo mood priming were administered these measures at each time point to 
maintain continuity between all participant groups.  
Following the experimental portion of the study, participants completed the 
BDI-II to assess current depressive symptoms, and the STAI (Spielberger) to assess 
the level of anxiety.  Following completion of these measures, an advanced graduate 
student in clinical psychology conducted the clinical interview (SCID) to confirm 
their depression status.   
Design 
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The design for the primary experiment was a 2 (diagnostic group: previously 
depressed and mood-primed never-depressed participants) x 2 (visual field: right and 
left VF) x 2 (target valence:  positive or negative) x 2 (prime-target relatedness; either 
related or unrelated prime-target pairings) x 2 (time:  pre vs. post-mood induction) 
mixed analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) with state anxiety as a covariate.  All 
variables were within-subjects factors with the exception of diagnostic group, which 
served as a between-subjects factor.   Dependent variables were response accuracy 
and response time. 
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Results 
Data Reduction 
 Overall accuracy across participant groups was relatively low, averaging 65% 
across previously depressed and mood-induced never depressed participants, and 
many participants systematically demonstrated poor accuracy – at or below chance – 
for specific study conditions (e.g., LVF/RH unrelated trials).  Furthermore, because 
reaction-time data are typically analyzed for accurate trials only, and many 
participants demonstrated poor accuracy for specific study conditions, any reaction 
time findings associated with these conditions would be unreliable.  Thus, reaction 
time data were not analyzed, and the primary analyses for the study focused on 
accuracy as the dependent variable.   
Participant Characteristics 
 See Table 1 for descriptive statistics and means and standard deviations for 
the BDI and STAI-State measures for each diagnostic group included in the study 
analyses.  Participants were all college students and predominantly in their late teen-
age years.  Moreover, formerly depressed participants were predominantly female, 
whereas participants in the never-depressed groups reflected greater numbers of male 
participants.   Previously depressed and mood-primed never depressed participants 
were also compared for potential between-group differences on the BDI and STAI-
State measures.  Although there were no significant differences between the two 
aforementioned diagnostic groups in terms of BDI scores (p = .072), previously 
depressed participants reported experiencing greater state-anxiety (STAI-State 
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average total score was 37) relative to mood-primed never depressed participants 
(STAI-State average total score was 31), which is supported by their significantly 
higher STAI-state scores, t(46) = 2.284, p = .027.   It is also worth noting that 
although none of the participants were currently depressed, approximately one-third 
reported significant state-anxiety, which is reflected in their sufficiently elevated 
scores on the STAI-state measure (31.25% of previously depressed and mood-
induced never depressed participants had scores of 40 or higher on the STAI-State).  
Table 2 provides correlations among all of the self-report depressive and anxious 
affect measures used in the present study, which largely correlated with one another.   
Table 1.   
Participant Descriptives 
     Variable Formerly 
Depressed 
(n = 27) 
Mood-Induced 
Never Depressed  
(n = 21) 
Sham-Induced 
Never Depressed 
(n = 19) 
 
Age 
 
 
19.72 (1.60) 
 
18.95 (.97) 
 
19.32 (.95) 
 
Gender 
 
 
9M/18F 
 
11M/10F 
 
13M/6F 
 
BDI-II 
 
 
5.52 (3.01) 
 
3.90 (3.03) 
 
2.84 (3.15) 
 
STAI-S 
 
 
36.74 (8.84) 
 
31.05 (8.20) 
 
28 (8.25) 
Note.  Means and (standard deviations) for age, and self-reported depression and 
anxiety questionnaires.  M = male; F = female.  BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory 
(Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996); STAI-S = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, State Anxiety 
Subscale (Spielberger, 1968).   
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Table 2.   
Intercorrelations Among Depressive Symptom Severity, State Depression and State 
Anxiety Self-Report Measures. 
 
   
   Measure 
 
 
BDI-II 
 
STAI-S 
 
MAACL-R-D 
 
VAS 
  
Participants (N = 67) 
 
BDI-II __ .42* .22 .27* 
STAI-S .42* __ .41* .43* 
MAACL-R-D .22 .41* __ .60* 
VAS .27* .43* .60* __ 
Note:  BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory (Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996); STAI-S = 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, State Anxiety Subscale (Spielberger, 1968), MAACL-
R-D = Multiple Affect Adjective Checklist-Revised-Depression Subscale 
(Zuckerman & Lubin, 1965), VAS = Visual Analogue Scale (Grossberg & Grant, 
1978). 
* p < .05.   
Manipulation Check 
To confirm that the mood induction procedure was comparably successful at 
inducing a sad mood state for the previously depressed and never-depressed 
participants, and that the induced sad mood was maintained throughout the 
experiment, the VAS and MAACL measures were examined across time for both 
participant groups.  Moreover, because a pre-mood induction measure of the MAACL 
(i.e., baseline measure) was not included in this study, never-depressed participants 
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who experienced the sham-induction were also included in the omnibus analysis for 
this measure (as a between-groups comparison) to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
mood-priming procedure in inducing a temporary sad mood state.  For the MAACL, a 
3 (Group: previously depressed, mood induction never-depressed, and sham-
induction never depressed groups) x 2 (Time: immediately after induction procedures, 
end of the second DVF task administration) mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
was conducted.  Likewise, a 2 (Group:  previously depressed and never-depressed 
mood-induced groups) x 4 (Time) mixed ANOVA was conducted for the VAS. (Time 
1 was pre-induction, following the first DVF block; Time 2 refers to the 
administration after mood induction and following second DVF block; Time 3 was 
after the third experimental block of the DVF task; and Time 4 refers to the period 
following administration of the fourth DVF block).  In both analyses, Group was the 
between-subjects factor and Time was the within-subjects factor.  It was predicted 
that previously depressed and never-depressed participants who underwent the mood-
priming procedure would demonstrate significantly higher scores on the depression 
subscale of the MAACL at both time points relative to the sham-induced never-
depressed participants.  Moreover, it was predicted that there would be no significant 
differences on the MAACL between previously depressed and mood-primed never-
depressed participants, and no change over time for any of the groups.  For the VAS, 
it was predicted that previously depressed and mood-primed never-depressed 
participants would demonstrate significantly greater negative affect at Time 2 (after 
mood priming), Time 3 (after the third experimental block on the DVF task), and 
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Time 4 (following the fourth and final block of DVF task) relative to their VAS 
scores at Time 1 (pre-mood induction), with no significant differences between the 
two groups, and no significant differences between Time 2, Time 3, and Time 4.  
The omnibus ANOVA for the MAACL revealed a significant main effect for 
Group, F(2, 64) = 20.241, p < .001, and a significant Time-by-Group interaction, F(2, 
64) = 14.848, p < .001.  Consistent with study hypotheses, follow-up planned 
comparisons showed that previously depressed participants demonstrated a 
significantly higher score on the depression subscale of the MAACL compared with 
never-depressed participants who underwent the sham induction at Time 1, F(1, 64) = 
65.221, p < .001, and Time 2, F(1, 64) = 11.875, p = .001.  Furthermore, mood-
primed never-depressed participants also demonstrated significantly higher 
depression subscale scores relative to sham-induced never-depressed participants at 
Time 1, F(1,64) = 26.423, p < .001, and Time 2, F(1, 64) = 9.149, p = .004.  It was 
also found, however, that previously depressed participants scored significantly 
higher on the depression subscale relative to mood-primed never depressed 
participants at Time 1, F(1, 64) = 7.387, p = .008, which is inconsistent with study 
predictions (i.e., that previously depressed and mood primed never depressed groups 
would demonstrate comparably sad mood at both time points), but these group 
differences were no longer significant at Time 2 (p = .8).  Lastly, all follow-up 
comparisons remained significant even after the alpha level was adjusted for multiple 
comparisons (Dunn Sidak adjusted α = .017 for c = 3 comparisons).  Results of this 
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analysis are presented in Table 3, and means and standard deviations for the MAACL 
are provided in Table 4.   
Table 3 
Analysis of Variance for Depression Subscale of the MAACL-R 
 
     Source df F p 
 
Between Subjects 
Group 2 20.241** .01 
S within-group           
     Error 
64 (33.408)  
 
Within Subjects 
 
Time 1 3.861 .05 
Time x Group 2 14.848** .01 
Error 64 (6.63)  
Note:  Multiple Affect Adjective Checklist-Revised = MAACL-R (Zuckerman & 
Lubin, 1965). Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors.  S = 
subjects.   
* p < .05.  ** p < .01. 
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Table 4. 
Mean Total Scores and Standard Deviations for Depressive Affect After Induction as 
a Function of Time and Group 
                       
  Time 1   Time 2  
MAACL-R M SD N M SD n 
Formerly Depressed 21.70 a 3.55 27 17.81a 3.52 27 
Mood Primed Never 
Depressed 
18.24b 4.75 21 17.48 a 4.88 21 
Sham Induced Never 
Depressed 
11.11c 4.50 19 13.11 b 5.46 19 
 
Note.  Depressive affect scores are from the depression subscale of the Multiple 
Affect Adjective Checklist-Revised (MAACL-R; Zuckerman & Lubin, 1965).  Time 
1 = immediately following induction procedures, Time 2 = end of divided visual field 
task.  Means in the same column that do not share subscripts differ at p < .05 in the 
Dunn Sidak significant difference comparison. 
 Because depressive affect was of primary interest in the present study, an 
additional analysis for the MAACL depression subscale was conducted to examine 
whether depressive affect – that is relatively independent of general negative affect 
(e.g., anxiety) – was uniquely affected by the mood induction.  Toe examine the 
effect of the induction on depressive affect specifically, variance associated with the 
anxiety and hostility subscale scores was removed from the depression subscale using 
a multiple regression model to generate residualized depression scores (i.e., the 
variance remaining in the depression subscale after the variance associated with 
anxiety and hostility was removed), whereby the depression subscale was the 
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criterion variable and the hostility and anxiety subscales were the predictor variables.  
Results of these regression analyses are presented in Table 5.  These residualized 
depression scores, in turn, were used as the dependent variable (in lieu of the full 
depression subscale) in the repeated measures ANOVA model that was previously 
described for the MAACL analysis; the 3 (Group) x 2 (Time) repeated measures 
ANOVA.  This omnibus ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for Group, F(2, 
64) = 16.56, p < .001, and a significant Time-by-Group interaction, F(2, 64) = 6.029, 
p = .004.  Follow-up planned comparisons for this analysis revealed that previously 
depressed participants continued to demonstrate significantly higher scores on the 
residualized depression subscale of the MAACL compared with sham-induced never 
depressed participants at Time 1, F(1, 64) = 39.181, p < .001, and Time 2, F(1, 64) = 
13.723, p < .001.  Furthermore, mood-primed never depressed participants also 
demonstrated significantly higher residualized depression subscale scores relative to 
sham-induced never depressed participants at Time 1, F(1, 64) = 20.964, p < .001, 
and Time 2, F(1, 64) = 10.943, p = .002.  Notably, there were no significant 
differences between the previously depressed and mood-primed never depressed 
participants on the residualized depression subscale scores at either time point.  
Furthermore, all follow-up comparisons remained significant even after the alpha 
level was adjusted for multiple comparisons (Dunn Sidak adjusted α = .017 for c = 3 
comparisons).  Results of this analysis are presented in Table 6. 
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Table 5. 
Summary of Regression Analysis for Contribution of Anxiety and Hostility Subscales 
to Depression Subscale Scores for the MAACL (N = 67) 
 
     Variable B SE B 
Time 1   
     Anxiety 1.74 .81 
     Hostility .63 .71 
Time 2   
     Anxiety 1.30 .99 
     Hostility .63 .62 
 
Note:  Anxiety, hostility, and depression affect scores are from the depression 
subscale of the Multiple Affect Adjective Checklist-Revised (Zuckerman & Lubin, 
1965).  Time 1 = immediately following induction procedures, and Time 2 = end of 
divided visual field experiment. 
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Table 6. 
Analysis of Variance for Residual Depression Subscale Scores for the MAACL 
 
     Source df F p 
 
Between Subjects 
Group 2 16.56** .01 
S within-group 
error 
64 (33.47)  
 
Within Subjects 
Time 1 .24 .63 
Time x Group 2 6.03** .01 
Error 64 (7.21)  
Note:  Depressive affect scores are from the depression subscale of the Multiple 
Affect Adjective Checklist-Revised (Zuckerman & Lubin, 1965). Values enclosed in 
parentheses represent mean square errors.  S = subjects.  
* p < .05.  ** p < .01. 
Because the omnibus ANOVA model for the VAS did not meet the sphericity 
assumption, the Huynh-Feldt adjustment to the df was used.  A significant main effect 
for Time was observed, F(2.414, 111.061) = 27.082, p < .001.  Notably there was not 
a significant Time-by-Group interaction or a main effect for Group, suggesting that 
the mood induction produced a similar effect on previously depressed and never-
depressed participants.  Moreover, VAS scores at Time 2 and Time 3 showed 
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participants (in both groups) to be significantly sadder relative to their Time 1 scores 
(i.e., VAS scores were larger at Time 2 and Time 3 compared with Time 1 scores); 
F(1, 46) = 49.1, p < .001 and F(1, 46) = 15.232, p < .001, respectively.  However, 
comparisons examining the VAS scores at Time 4 revealed a non-significant 
difference between Time 1 and Time 4 scores, p = .057, suggesting that the sad mood 
had dissipated by the end of the experiment.  Furthermore, examination of VAS 
scores following mood priming suggested a linear decline in VAS scores, whereby 
the sad mood gradually dissipated over time because participants scores were lower 
(i.e., less sad) at Time 3 relative to Time 2, F(1, 46) = 20.033, p < .001, and Time 4 
relative to Time 3, F(1, 46) = 20.856, p < .001.  Additionally, all follow-up 
comparisons remained significant even after the alpha level was adjusted for multiple 
comparisons (Dunn Sidak adjusted α = .008512 for c = 6 comparisons).  Thus, 
although the VAS scores supported significant sad mood priming with the induction 
procedure that produced a similar effect for both participant groups, later VAS scores 
suggested that the sad mood wore off and participants’ reported mood state was no 
longer significantly different from baseline (i.e., prior to the mood priming 
procedure).  Results of this analysis are presented in Table 7, and means and standard 
deviations for the VAS are provided in Table 8.   
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Table 7 
Analysis of Variance for the VAS 
     Source df F p 
 
Between Subjects 
Group 1 .13 .73 
S within-group 
error 
46 (11.52)  
 
Within Subjects 
Time 2.41 27.08** .01 
Time x Group 2.41 2.26 .10 
Error 111.06 (7.21)  
Note:  VAS = Visual Analogue Scale (Grossberg & Grant, 1978).  Values enclosed in 
parentheses represent mean square errors.  S = subjects.  A Huynh-Feldt adjustment  
was used for the df because the model did not meet the sphericity assumption for the 
analysis of variance test.   
* p < .05.  ** p < .01. 
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Table 8. 
Mean Total Scores and Standard Deviations for Sad Mood as a Function of Time and 
Diagnostic Group.  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
                       Formerly Depressed                 Mood-Primed Never Depressed     
VAS M SD N M SD n 
 
Before Mood Induction 
   
Time 1 1.83 a 1.91 27 1.99 a 1.92 21 
 
After Mood Induction 
 
Time 2 5.00b 2.63 27 3.99 b 2.08 21 
Time 3 3.35 b 2.27 27 3.03 b 1.92 21 
Time 4 2.24 a 1.99 27 2.71 a 2.05 21 
Note.  Sad mood scores are based on subjects’ Visual Analogue Scale ratings (VAS; 
Grossberg & Grant, 1978).  Time 1 = prior to induction procedures, Time 2 = 
immediately following induction procedures, Time 3 = following the third block of 
the divided visual field task, and Time 4 = end of divided visual field experiment.  
Means in the same column that do not share subscripts with Time 1 VAS scores differ 
at p < .05 in the Dunn Sidak significant difference comparison. 
In summary, the VAS and MAACL measures largely provided support for the 
efficacy of the mood induction procedure in producing a comparably sad mood state 
for previously depressed and never-depressed participants (i.e., the VAS and 
MAACL scores supported an immediate effect of sad mood priming for both groups 
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of participants).  According to the MAACL, however, mood priming may have 
initially produced greater global negative affect (e.g., greater anxiety and/or hostility) 
in previously depressed participants, but it was associated with comparable 
depressive affect across the diagnostic groups.  Moreover, this between-group 
difference wore off relatively quickly (i.e., previously depressed participants did not 
score significantly higher than mood primed never-depressed participants on the full 
depression subscale for the second MAACL administered), and VAS scores 
suggested that the procedure produced a similar effect for both groups of participants.  
Furthermore, VAS scores suggested that the sad mood state wore off relatively 
quickly - given the brief duration of the experiment – because final VAS scores were 
not significantly different from baseline (pre-induction) for either group.  Depression 
(and residualized depression) subscale scores from the second MAACL administered, 
however, suggested that there may have been an enduring effect of the mood 
induction procedure because both groups (previously depressed and mood primed 
never depressed participants) continued to demonstrate greater subscale (and 
residualized subscale) scores relative to sham-induced never-depressed participants.  
Given the mixed results from the VAS and MAACL scores – particularly the 
dissipating sad mood state that was associated with the VAS and not the MAACL - it 
is highly probable that these measures are tapping different aspects associated with a 
sad mood state.  
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Tests for Fatigue, Practice, and Wordlist Effects 
In order to examine the effects of mood priming on DVF task performance, it 
was also important to ensure that the two word lists were equivalent and that there 
were no significant fatigue or practice effects for the task over time so that any 
observed differences in performance following mood priming could be attributed to a 
sad mood and not one of the aforementioned effects.  Thus, two separate repeated 
measures ANOVA models were conducted to test for these effects with sham induced 
never-depressed participants for the primary dependent variable of interest – 
accuracy.  First, a 2 (Time:  first administration of the DVF task for blocks 1 and 2, 
second administration of the DVF task for blocks 3 and 4) x 2 (VF: right and left) x 2 
(target Valence:  positive or negative) x 2 (Relatedness: related prime-target pair or 
unrelated) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with sham-induced, never-
depressed participants to test for practice and fatigue effects.  It was expected that 
there would be no effect of time on accuracy rates (i.e., no main effects or interactions 
with Time), which would be consistent with no practice or fatigue effects.  Results of 
this analysis are presented in Table 9, and means and standard deviations are provided 
in Table 10.  The analysis revealed no significant effect of Time (main effect, p = 
.475) on DVF task accuracy rates, and Time did not significantly interact with any of 
the other independent variables.   
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Table 9 
Analysis of Variance for Fatigue and Practice Effects 
     Source df F p 
 
Within Subjects 
 
Time 1 .53 .48 
S within-group error 18 (.02)  
VF 1 28.70** .01 
S within-group error 18 (.03)  
Valence 1 .75 .40 
S within-group error 18 (.03)  
Relatedness 1 4.47* .05 
S within-group error 18 (.02)  
Time X VF 1 .37 .55 
S within-group error 18 (.01)  
Time X Valence 1 .25 .63 
S within-group error 18 (.01)  
VF X Valence 1 2.35 .14 
S within-group error 18 (.13)  
Time X VF X Valence 1 1.23 .28 
S within-group error 18 (.01)  
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Table 9 (continued). 
     Source df F p 
 
Within Subjects 
 
Time X Related 1 .10 .76 
S within-group error 18 (.01)  
VF X Related 1 .05 .82 
S within-group error 18 (.01)  
Time X VF X Related 1 3.98 .06 
S within-group error 18 (.01)  
Valence X Related 1 5.27* .03 
S within-group error 18 (.01)  
Time X Valence X Related 1 1.38 .26 
S within-group error 18 (.01)  
VF X Valence X Related 1 .01 .97 
S within-group error 18 (.01)  
Time X VF X Valence X 
Related 
 
1 1.54 .23 
S within-group error 18 (.01)  
Note:  Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors.  S = subjects.   
* p < .05.  ** p < .01. 
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Table 10. 
Mean Accuracy Rates and Standard Deviations as a Function of Time, Visual Field, 
Valence, and Prime-Target Relationship.   
 
 LVF 
 
RVF 
  
Positive 
 
Negative 
 
Positive 
 
Negative 
 
     Relatedness 
 
M 
 
SD 
 
M 
 
SD 
 
M 
 
SD 
 
M 
 
SD 
 
 
 
 
Before Induction 
Related 
 
61 .22 70 .17 76 .14 72 .19 
Unrelated 
 
58 .23 62 .18 79 .16 66 .24 
 
 
 
 
After Induction 
Related 61 
 
.22 
 
66 .16 81 .13 74 .15 
Unrelated 
 
63 .22 63 .18 70 .12 68 .17 
Note.  Sham-induced control subjects, n = 19.  LVF = left visual field, RVF = right 
visual field.  Accuracy rates reflect percent of correctly identified targets.   
The second model tested for wordlist effects and was a 2 (Wordlist: wordlist 1 
or wordlist 2) x 2 VF (right and left VF) x 2 (target valence:  positive or negative) x 2 
(relatedness: related prime-target pair or unrelated) repeated measures ANOVA for 
the accuracy dependent variable.  It was expected that there would be no effect of 
wordlist on task performance for accuracy rates (i.e., no main effect and no 
interactions), which would be consistent with wordlist equivalency.  Results of this 
analysis are presented in Table 11, and means and standard deviations are provided in 
Table 12.   The analysis revealed no significant differences between the wordlists on 
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overall accuracy rates (p = .116).  However, wordlist significantly interacted with the 
prime-target relatedness independent variable, F(1, 18) = 6.861, p = .017.  
Examination of this 2-way interaction revealed that sham induced never-depressed 
participants demonstrated higher accuracy on prime-target related trials for wordlist 1 
(72.4%) compared with wordlist 2 (67.6%).  However, this difference between the 
wordlists didn’t affect overall accuracy rates, which is reflected by the non-significant 
main effect for Wordlist.  Nonetheless, if the primary analyses for the study 
examining accuracy rates for previously depressed and mood primed never depressed 
participants revealed a significant effect for the Time independent variable – 
particularly if it interacted with Relatedness - findings would need to be interpreted 
with caution and statistically controlled to permit interpretation of mood priming 
effects.    
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Table 11 
Analysis of Variance for Wordlist Effects 
     Source df F p 
 
Within Subjects 
 
Wordlist 1 2.72 .12 
S within-group error 18 (.02)  
VF 1 28.70** .01 
S within-group error 18 (.03)  
Valence 1 .75 .40 
S within-group error 18 (.03)  
Relatedness 1 4.47* .05 
S within-group error 18 (.02)  
Wordlist X VF 1 2.71 .117 
S within-group error 18 (.01)  
Wordlist X Valence 1 .33 .58 
S within-group error 18 (.01)  
VF X Valence 1 2.35 .14 
S within-group error 18 (.13)  
Wordlist X VF X Valence 1 2.81 .11 
S within-group error 18 (.01)  
 
 
  
 
60 
 
Table 11 (continued). 
     Source df F p 
 
Within Subjects 
 
Wordlist X Related 1 6.86* .02 
S within-group error 18 (.01)  
VF X Related 1 .05 .82 
S within-group error 18 (.01)  
Wordlist X VF X Related 1 1.96 .18 
S within-group error 18 (.01)  
Valence X Related 1 5.27* .03 
S within-group error 18 (.01)  
Wordlist X Valence X Related 1 2.95 .10 
S within-group error 18 (.01)  
VF X Valence X Related 1 .01 .97 
S within-group error 18 (.01)  
Wordlist X VF X Valence X 
Related 
 
1 .05 .82 
S within-group error 18 (.01)  
Note:  Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors.  S = subjects.   
* p < .05.  ** p < .01. 
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Table 12. 
Mean Accuracy Rates and Standard Deviations as a Function of Wordlist, Visual 
Field, Valence, and Prime-Target Relationship.  
 LVF 
 
RVF 
  
Positive 
 
Negative 
 
Positive 
 
Negative 
 
     Relatedness 
 
M 
 
SD 
 
M 
 
SD 
 
M 
 
SD 
 
M 
 
SD 
 
 
 
 
Wordlist 1 
Related 
 
62 .22 72 .17 81 .12 74 .16 
Unrelated 
 
62 .24 64 .15 78 .13 63 .22 
 
 
 
 
Wordlist 2 
Related 60 
 
.21 
 
64 .15 75 .15 71 .18 
Unrelated 
 
59 .21 61 .21 77 .15 70 .18 
 Note.  Sham-induced control subjects, n = 19.  LVF = left visual field, RVF = right 
visual field.  Accuracy rates reflect percent of correctly identified targets.   
 
Preliminary Analyses for Divided Visual Field Task 
Because the anxiety covariate did not significantly interact with any of the 
other independent variables - and there was no main effect for this variable – anxiety 
was subsequently removed from the model and the omnibus analysis was re-run using 
a mixed ANOVA model. Results of this analysis are presented in Table 13.  Thus, 
accuracy rates were analyzed in a 2 (Group: previously depressed and mood-primed 
never-depressed participants) x 2 (VF:  right and left) x 2 (target valence:  positive or 
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negative) x 2 (prime-target relatedness) x 2 (Time:  pre vs. post-mood induction 
[Time 1 vs. Time 2) mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA).  For all planned and post-
hoc analyses, an alpha level of .05 was used as the critical value. 
Table 13 
Analysis of Variance for Accuracy Rates Among Previously Depressed and Mood-
Primed Never Depressed Participants with Varied Degrees of State-Anxiety (N = 48) 
 
     Source df F p 
 
Between Subjects 
 
Group 1 4.24 .05 
STAI-S 1 .75 .39 
S within-group error 45 (.10)  
 
Within Subjects 
 
Time 1 .12 .74 
Time X STAI-S 1 .75 .39 
Time X Group 1 .02 .89 
S within-group error 45 (.02)  
VF 1 19.83** .01 
VF X STAI-S 1 1.88 .18 
VF X Group 1 .07 .80 
S within-group error 45 (.03)  
Valence 1 .31 .58 
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Table 13 (continued). 
     Source df F P 
 
Within Subjects 
 
Valence X STAI-S 1 .37 .55 
Valence X Group 1 .62 .43 
S within-group error 45 (.04)  
Relatedness 1 1.95 .17 
Relatedness X STAI-S 1 .08 .77 
Relatedness X Group 1 .19 .67 
S within-group error 45 (.03)  
Time X VF 1 .64 .43 
Time X VF X STAI-S 1 .37 .55 
Time X VF X Group 1 .05 .82 
S within-group error 45 (.01)  
Time X Valence 1 1.15 .29 
Time X Valence X STAI-S 
 
1 .93 .34 
Time X Valence X Group 1 .36 .55 
S within-group error 45 (.01)  
VF X Valence 1 .07 .80 
VF X Valence X STAI-S 1 .01 .96 
VF X Valence X Group 1 .07 .79 
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Table 13 (continued). 
     Source df F p 
 
Within Subjects 
 
S within-group error 45 (.03)  
Time X VF X Valence 1 .07 .80 
Time X VF X Valence X 
STAI- S 
 
1 .02 .89 
Time X VF X Valence X 
Group 
 
1 .62 .44 
S within-group error 45 (.02)  
Time X Related 1 .70 .41 
Time X Related X STAI-S 1 .78 .38 
Time X Related X Group 1 .90 .35 
S within-group error 45 (.02)  
VF X Related 1 1.39 .25 
VF X Related X STAI-S 1 .83 .37 
VF X Related X Group 1 2.99 .09 
S within-group error 45 (.01)  
Time X VF X Related 1 .22 .64 
Time X VF X Related X 
STAI-S 
 
1 .37 .55 
Time X VF X Related X 
Group 
 
1 .24 .63 
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Table 13 (continued). 
     Source df F p 
 
Within Subjects 
 
S within-group error 45 (.01)  
Valence X Related 1 .40 .53 
Valence X Related X STAI-S 
 
1 .01 .93 
Valence X Related X Group 1 .76 .39 
S within-group error 45 (.01)  
Time X Valence X Related 1 .04 .85 
Time X Valence X Related X 
STAI-S 
 
1 .02 .90 
Time X Valence X Related X 
Group 
 
1 .03 .87 
S within-group error 45 (.01)  
VF X Valence X Related 1 3.18 .08 
VF X Valence X Related X 
STAI-S 
 
1 1.72 .20 
VF X Valence X Related X 
Group 
 
1 3.71 .06 
S within-group error 45 (.01)  
Time X VF X Valence X 
Related  
 
1 .97 .33 
Time X VF X Valence X 
Related X STAI-S 
 
1 1.41 .24 
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Table 13 (continued). 
     Source df F p 
Time X VF X Valence X 
Related X Group 
 
1 .07 .79 
S within-group error 45 (.01)  
Note:  Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors.  S = subjects.  
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, State Anxiety Subscale (Spielberger, 1968).  
* p < .05.  ** p < .01. 
The omnibus ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for visual field (VF) 
for the target presentation, F(1, 46) = 163.247, p < .001, indicating that words 
presented to the RVF/LH were more accurately judged (73.19%) than words 
presented to the LVF/RH (57.65%).  Moreover, there were several additional main 
effects and interaction terms that were found to be statistically significant, however, 
given the very large magnitude of the VF main effect, these findings are extremely 
suspect.  In fact, VF main effects associated with the DVF task are typically on the 
order of a 10% difference in accuracy (e.g., Banich, 1997), and the present study 
evidenced a VF main effect difference on the order of 16%, which suggests 
something unusual about the task performance for many of the participants in the 
present study.  There are a number of possible explanations for this abnormally large 
VF main effect, which will be reviewed in the discussion, however, it seems clear that 
many participants in the present study performed very poorly on LVF/RH trials 
relative to RVF/LH trials as is evidenced by their very poor LVF/RH accuracy rate 
(57.65%) compared with their predictable RVF/LH accuracy rate (73.19%); Atchley 
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and colleagues (2005) observed a LVF/RH accuracy rate of 65%, and RVF/LH 
accuracy rate of 74%.  Therefore, in order to address the very poor LVF/RH accuracy 
rate (which was not much greater than chance across participants) – and indirectly 
address the unusually large VF main effect - participants who did not perform 
significantly better than chance for LVF/RH trials were excluded from all subsequent 
analyses, and the omnibus ANOVA was re-run without these participants.   
Divided Visual Field Task Analyses - Accuracy 
 Exclusion of participants with poor accuracy for LVF/RH trials eliminated 
many participants from the analysis, and therefore, made it challenging to identify 
statistically significant findings because of very low power; 10 previously depressed 
and 13 mood-induced never-depressed participants remained in the model.  However, 
there were still a limited number of statistically significant findings when the mixed 
ANOVA model was re-run using only participants with accuracy rates that were 
significantly better than chance for the LVF/RH trials.    
This revised omnibus ANOVA model (with 23 participants) revealed a 
significant main effect for VF, F(1, 21) = 65.579, p < .001, indicating that words 
presented to the RVF/LH were more accurately judged (78%) than words presented to 
the LVF/RH (65%).  Moreover, there was a significant main effect for Relatedness 
(prime-target relationship), F(1, 21) = 9.977, p = .005, such that participants 
responded with greater accuracy to related trials (74%) than unrelated trials (69%).  
The Relatedness main effect, however, is best subsumed by the significant two-way 
interaction between Valence and Relatedness, F(1, 21) = 4.991, p = .036.  Results of 
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this analysis are presented in Table 14, and means and standard deviations are 
provided in Table 15.   
Table 14 
Analysis of Variance for Accuracy Rates Among Previously Depressed and Mood-
Primed Never Depressed Participants (N = 23) 
 
     Source df F p 
 
Between Subjects 
 
Group 1 1.64 .22 
S within-group error 21 (.08)  
 
Within Subjects 
 
Time 1 2.07 .17 
Time X Group 1 .36 .56 
S within-group error 21 (.02)  
VF 1 65.58** .01 
VF X Group 1 1.95 .18 
S within-group error 21 (.02)  
Valence 1 .18 .68 
Valence X Group 1 .53 .48 
S within-group error 21 (.03)  
Relatedness 1 9.98** .01 
Relatedness X Group 1 .03 .87 
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Table 14 (continued). 
     Source df F p 
 
Within Subjects 
 
S within-group error 21 (.03)  
Time X VF 1 .23 .64 
Time X VF X Group 1 .01 .98 
S within-group error 21 (.01)  
Time X Valence 1 .06 .81 
Time X Valence X Group 1 .01 .98 
S within-group error 21 (.01)  
VF X Valence 1 2.37 .14 
VF X Valence X Group 1 .07 .80 
S within-group error 21 (.02)  
Time X VF X Valence 1 .35 .56 
Time X VF X Valence X 
Group 
 
1 .39 .54 
S within-group error 21 (.01)  
Time X Related 1 .11 .75 
Time X Related X Group 1 1.40 .25 
S within-group error 21 (.01)  
VF X Related 1 2.98 .10 
VF X Related X Group 1 3.49 .08 
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Table 14 (continued). 
     Source df F p 
 
Within Subjects 
 
S within-group error 21 (.01)  
Time X VF X Related 1 .33 .57 
Time X VF X Related X 
Group 
 
1 .08 .78 
S within-group error 21 (.01)  
Valence X Related 1 4.99* .04 
Valence X Related X Group 1 .13 .72 
S within-group error 21 (.01)  
Time X Valence X Related 1 .14 .71 
Time X Valence X Related X 
Group 
 
1 .16 .70 
S within-group error 21 (.01)  
VF X Valence X Related 1 2.85 .11 
VF X Valence X Related X 
Group 
 
1 .47 .50 
S within-group error 21 (.01)  
Time X VF X Valence X 
Related  
 
1 4.01 .06 
Time X VF X Valence X 
Related X Group 
 
1 .09 .77 
S within-group error 21 (.01)  
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Note:  Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors.  S = subjects.   
* p < .05.  ** p < .01. 
Table 15 
Mean Accuracy Rates and Standard Deviations as a Function of Time, Visual Field, 
Valence, Prime-Target Relationship, and Group.  
 
 Previously Depressed 
 
Never Depressed 
  
Positive 
 
Negative 
 
Positive 
 
Negative 
 
      
 
LVF 
 
RVF 
 
LVF 
 
RVF 
 
LVF 
 
RVF 
 
LVF 
 
RVF 
 
 
 
 
Before Induction 
Related 
 
        
     M 
 
64 76 71 74 60 84 74 .16 
     SD 
 
.11 .14 .14 .13 .16 .15 63 .22 
Unrelated 
 
        
     M 
 
60 72 56 70 64 77 63 77 
     SD 
 
.12 .11 .12 .15 .15 .11 .11 .11 
 
 
 
 
After Induction 
Related 
 
        
     M 67 
 
76 
 
70 77 68 84 71 85 
     SD 
 
.13 .15 .12 .16 .15 .08 .13 .06 
Unrelated 
 
        
     M 
 
63 80 62 74 61 79 63 78 
     SD .13 .11 .13 .17 .15 .12 .20 .12 
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Note.  Previously depressed subjects, n = 10, never-depressed subjects, n = 13.  LVF 
= left visual field, RVF = right visual field.  Accuracy rates reflect percent of 
correctly identified targets.   
Examination of this two-way interaction revealed a related-trial advantage for 
negative targets, t(22) = 4.121, p < .001, such that negative targets that were preceded 
by a related prime word (i.e., a negative prime word) were judged more accurately 
(76%) than negative targets preceded by an unrelated prime word (68%).  The pattern 
of results for positive targets, however, trended in the predicted direction (i.e., 
positive target words preceded by a related prime word were judged more accurately 
than positive target words preceded by an unrelated prime), but was not statistically 
significant, p = .118.   
Accuracy Rate and Length of Time Since the Most Recent Major Depressive Episode  
 In addition to the primary analysis for accuracy, which compared diagnostic 
groups, a repeated measures ANCOVA was conducted for previously depressed 
participants - with above chance accuracy rates for the LVF/RH - to determine 
whether the length of time that had lapsed since their most recent major depressive 
episode (MDE) influenced their performance on the DVF task.  The design for this 
analysis was a 2 (VF: right and left) x 2 (Valence:  positive or negative) x 2 
(Relatedness: related or unrelated) x 2 (Time:  pre vs. post-mood induction) 
ANCOVA with the number of months since their most recent MDE episode included 
as a covariate.  All variables were within subjects factors, and accuracy was the 
dependent variable.  This analysis revealed no significant interactions for any of the 
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independent variables, and there was no evidence to support a significant influence of 
length of time since the most recent MDE on participants’ valence judgments for 
negative and positive words.  However, given the very small sample size (n = 10) for 
this analysis, the lack of significant findings was not unexpected.   
Table 16 
Analysis of Variance for Accuracy Rates Among Previously Depressed Participants 
in Relation to Number of Months in Recovery from Depression (N = 10) 
 
     Source df F p 
 
Between Subjects 
 
Months 1 1.42 .27 
S within-group error 8 (.07)  
 
Within Subjects 
 
Time 1 .07 .79 
Time X Months 1 2.28 .17 
S within-group error 8 (.02)  
VF 1 5.37 .05* 
VF X Months 1 2.05 .19 
S within-group error 8 (.03)  
Valence 1 .08 .78 
Valence X Months 1 .07 .80 
S within-group error 8 (.04)  
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Table 16 (continued). 
     Source df F p 
 
Within Subjects 
 
Relatedness 1 5.14 .05 
Relatedness X Months 1 .19 .67 
S within-group error 8 (.02)  
Time X VF 1 .40 .55 
Time X VF X Months 1 2.21 .18 
S within-group error 8 (.01)  
Time X Valence 1 .75 .41 
Time X Valence X Months 
 
1 1.71 .23 
S within-group error 8 (.01)  
VF X Valence 1 .07 .80 
VF X Valence X Months 1 .77 .41 
S within-group error 45 (.01)  
Time X VF X Valence 1 .43 .53 
Time X VF X Valence X 
Months 
 
1 1.34 .28 
S within-group error 8 (.02)  
Time X Related 1 .46 .52 
Time X Related X Months 1 .14 .72 
S within-group error 8 (.01)  
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Table 16 (continued). 
     Source df F p 
 
Within Subjects 
 
VF X Related 1 3.45 .10 
VF X Related X Months 1 .54 .48 
S within-group error 8 (.01)  
Time X VF X Related 1 .01 .92 
Time X VF X Related X 
Months 
 
1 .01 .96 
S within-group error 8 (.01)  
Valence X Related 1 12.63 .01** 
Valence X Related X Months 
 
1 4.79 .06 
S within-group error 8 (.01)  
Time X Valence X Related 1 .01 .99 
Time X Valence X Related X 
Months 
1 .01 .10 
S within-group error 8 (.01)  
Note:  Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors.  S = subjects.  
Months = Number of months since the most recent major depressive episode. 
* p < .05.  ** p < .01. 
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Discussion 
 The primary aim of this study was to examine the interrelationships among 
mood state, depressive experience, and anxious symptomatology in the processing of 
emotional words using a divided visual field paradigm.  Specifically, this study 
attempted: (a) to replicate the findings of Atchley et al. (2003, 2005), who observed 
results consistent with an enduring depressive verbal processing bias in the right 
hemisphere, even in the absence of sad mood; and (b) to provide answers to 
remaining questions about the potential influence of state dysphoria and state anxiety 
on emotional processing.  This study replicated the well-established finding of a left 
hemispheric/RVF advantage for language processing – as evidenced by participants’ 
higher accuracy rates for all words presented to the RVF.  Moreover, the well-
established processing advantage on a valence judgment task for valence-primed 
words was also supported, inasmuch as negative words that were preceded by a 
valence-related prime were judged more accurately.  The present study, however, 
failed to replicate previously reported findings of superior right hemispheric (RH) 
accuracy judgments, and of a larger valence-priming advantage for negative words 
among previously depressed participants relative to never-depressed participants 
(Atchley et al., 2003 & 2005).   
 Although the present study failed to replicate Atchley and colleagues’ 
previous findings (2003 & 2005), it is not surprising given that the majority of 
participants demonstrated exceptionally poor accuracy for all words presented to the 
LVF/RH, and therefore, were excluded from further analyses.  Consequently, the 
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analyses for the present study possessed very limited power for detecting reliable 
differences in performance on the DVF task within individual participants and 
between diagnostic groups.  Thus, the null findings associated with the present study 
should not be accepted as indicative of what would be found in studies with larger 
samples sizes and greater statistical power, and furthermore, should not be interpreted 
as an appropriate comparison to Atchley and colleagues’ previous studies because of 
its limited power (2003 & 2005).   However, given that the present study attempted to 
replicate Atchley and colleagues’ previous findings – among several other stated 
study aims - it seems paramount to identify possible explanations for the present 
study’s poor LVF/RH accuracy rate, which led to the exclusion of many participants 
and contributed to the study’s null findings (because of limited statistical power). 
One possible explanation for the poor RH accuracy rate relates to the nature of 
the DVF task, which is challenging largely because targets are presented for a very 
short duration to reduce the likelihood that participants move their eyes between trials 
(which could result in targets not being projected to the intended hemisphere).  
Because of the inherent difficulty associated with the DVF task, participants typically 
require some practice in order to gain proficiency at it.  Although participants in the 
present study engaged in a practice session (consisting of 30 trials) and 4 practice 
trials at the beginning of each block, it is quite possible that they did not have 
sufficient practice with it, and therefore, their performance was compromised during 
the experiment; overall accuracy for the present study was 65% across diagnostic 
groups and VFs compared with an average of 73% for Atchley and colleagues’ 
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previous studies combined.  Notably, task difficulty and insufficient practice would 
tend to disproportionately affect participants’ ability to accurately detect word targets 
for LVF/RH trials relative to RVF/LH trials because left hemisphere word targets are 
generally easier to identify (i.e., the left hemisphere is superior at language 
comprehension in 95% of right-handed individuals, see Rasmussen & Milner, 1977b).  
Thus, task difficulty combined with insufficient practice likely contributed to the poor 
accuracy rate observed for LVF/RH trials in the present study.   
Additionally, it remains possible that the feedback provided with each trial – 
where participants were informed as to whether their response was correct, incorrect, 
or not detected –inadvertently contributed to some of the participants’ poor accuracy 
rates because it was experienced as stressful (e.g., participants observed that they 
were incorrect at detecting targets on multiple trials).  In fact, numerous studies have 
demonstrated a negative correlation between high levels of stress/arousal and 
performance on challenging cognitive tasks (e.g., Bargh & Cohen, 1978; Burgess & 
Hokanson, 1964; Hembree, 1988).  Furthermore, because individuals generally find it 
easier to identify linguistic targets presented to the RVF/LH (e.g., Banich, 1997; 
Rasmussen & Milner, 1977b), some participants in the present study may have shifted 
their gaze (consciously or unconsciously) slightly to the right (despite explicit 
instructions to maintain their fixation to where the centrally presented fixation cross 
was displayed) in an attempt to improve their accuracy and decrease the number of 
incorrect response feedback messages that they received.  If several of the 
participants shifted their gaze to the right, this would help to explain not only the very 
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poor accuracy rate for LVF/RH trials, but would also explain the very large VF main 
effect (whereby participants’ accuracy rates for RVF/LH trials was much greater than 
their accuracy for LVF/RH trials) that was several magnitudes greater than is 
typically observed with the DVF task (e.g., Banich, 1997).  By shifting their gaze to 
the right, this would have improved their accuracy for RVF/LH trials while 
negatively impacting their performance on LVF/RH trials.  Moreover, if many of the 
participants were shifting their gaze on multiple trials, overall findings associated 
with their performance on this task would need to be interpreted with extreme caution 
because many of the targets were no longer being projected to the intended 
hemisphere.  In other words, if their gaze was shifted to the right, then they were no 
longer processing those right-sided targets with their left hemisphere exclusively and 
these targets were being projected to both hemispheres; and left-sided targets weren’t 
being projected to either hemisphere because they were no longer in the visual field.  
Thus, any findings associated with the VF/hemispheres would be un-interpretable 
because VF of target presentation (according the computer) could no longer be 
assumed to relate to processing capabilities within a specific hemisphere (i.e., it’s 
impossible to tell which hemisphere(s) is processing the targets).   
 Another potentially viable explanation for the poor LVF/RH accuracy rate 
derives from the present study’s list of verbal stimuli.  Unlike previous investigations 
(Atchely et al., 2003, 2005), the present study specifically excluded potential stimulus 
words that were characterized as either high arousal or low arousal based on previous 
norming research (Bradley & Lang, 1999); instead, it employed only moderately 
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arousing words.  The rationale behind this choice was the desire to control for the 
potential effect of stimulus arousal level and, thereby, to better isolate the effect of 
word valence on verbal processing in the study experimental task.  However, Atchley 
and colleagues (2005) have observed significantly higher overall accuracy in judging 
high-arousal negative words (relative to negative words that are less arousing), and 
also greater accuracy in judging low-arousal positive words (relative to positive 
words that are higher in arousal) – a pattern that appears to be lateralized to the right 
hemisphere.  Thus, elimination of the most salient words from the wordlists – that 
were previously shown to be especially salient for the RH - may have inadvertently 
compromised overall RH performance on the valence-judgment task.   
Lastly, it is important to note that the present study findings suggest that 
LVF/RH accuracy rates were more seriously compromised for previously-depressed 
than never-depressed participants; an assertion that is supported by the relatively 
greater numbers of previously depressed participants who were excluded from 
subsequent analyses because of poor LVF/RH accuracy rates (17 of 27 previously 
depressed participants were excluded relative to 8 of 21 never-depressed 
participants).   Thus, in addition to addressing the poor LVF/RH accuracy rates across 
diagnostic groups, it is also important to address why accuracy judgments were 
compromised to a greater extent for previously depressed participants in the present 
study.   
One possible explanation for the more seriously compromised DVF task 
performance of previously depressed participants in the present study relates to the 
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significantly greater state-anxiety that they reported relative to mood-primed never 
depressed participants (i.e., previously depressed participants had significantly higher 
scores on the STAI-State measure).  Although, STAI-state scores were not found to 
significantly influence participants’ performance on the DVF task when this variable 
was included in the omnibus ANOVA model, findings associated with this analysis 
were difficult to interpret because of the abnormally large VF main effect, which may 
have been a consequence (at least in part) of multiple participants performing the task 
incorrectly (i.e., shifting the eyes right, multiple eye movements).  Thus, any findings 
associated with the original omnibus analysis (including null findings) should be 
interpreted with extreme caution.  Moreover, it remains possible that there is a subtle 
- and negative effect - of state-anxiety on DVF task performance, but the present 
study design was not sufficiently powerful to detect it.  As a result, it is probably best 
to interpret the non-significant findings for state-anxiety on DVF task performance in 
the present study as insufficient evidence supporting its influence on this task that 
warrants further investigation.  Moreover, given the challenging nature of the DVF 
task and the well-documented relationship between elevated levels of arousal (e.g., 
state-anxiety) and compromised performance on challenging tasks (e.g., Bargh & 
Cohen; Burgess & Hokanson; Hembree), greater state-anxiety in the previously 
depressed participants appears to be an alternative explanation for their relatively 
poor performance (although admittedly lacking in empirical support in the present 
study) that may facilitate reconciliation within a theoretical framework.  Furthermore, 
as was suggested earlier, feedback given during the DVF experiment (e.g., incorrect 
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response) may have been stressful for participants, and experienced as particularly 
stressful for participants who reported feeling more anxious (i.e., reported higher state 
anxiety) to begin with.  Thus, greater state-anxiety experienced by previously 
depressed participants during the DVF task may also help to explain their inferior 
performance on LVF/RH trials relative to never-depressed participants. 
Another potential explanation for previously depressed participants’ 
compromised performance on the DVF task in the present study relates to the 
possibility that they may have been more affected by the mood induction relative to 
never depressed participants (at least initially), and their greater global negative affect 
(e.g., anxiety and/or hostility according to the MAACL), in turn, may have had a 
detrimental influence on their performance during the task.  Although findings from 
the VAS do not support this assertion – because there were no significant differences 
between the diagnostic groups on this measure – findings from the MAACL suggest 
that the mood induction was initially more potent for previously depressed 
participants.  Moreover, if previously depressed participants were experiencing 
greater negative affect relative to never-depressed participants during portions of the 
DVF task, then they may have felt more stressed by the negative feedback (i.e., 
incorrect response) at those times, and subsequently less confident in their ability to 
accurately identify targets, which compromised their performance (especially for the 
more challenging LVF targets).  Thus, greater negative affect in previously depressed 
participants – relative to never depressed participants – during portions of the DVF 
task may have negatively impacted their performance at these times, and resulted in 
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their lower accuracy rates (for LVF trials in particular) overall for the experiment.  
Notably, although it would be difficult to explain their compromised performance for 
the entire experiment based on this account - because they only reported greater 
global negative affect (e.g., greater anxiety and/or hostility on the MAACL) during 
part of the experiment – this interpretation in combination with other factors 
(including the aforementioned hypothesis) may help to explain their lower accuracy 
rates relative to never-depressed participants (i.e., a combination of factors 
contributed to their poorer performance).  Furthermore, previously depressed 
participants reported experiencing greater state-anxiety overall (higher scores on the 
STAI-state measure that was given at the end of the experiment) relative to never-
depressed participants, and therefore, may have been more vulnerable to stressful 
aspects associated with the DVF task (particularly the more challenging LVF targets). 
Finally, an alternative explanation for previously depressed participants’ 
lower accuracy rates in the present study may best be described as sample 
characteristics of this group that were not measured, but nonetheless differed 
significantly from previously depressed individuals recruited in other studies, and 
negatively impacted their performance on the DVF task.  For example, two variables 
that were not measured in the present study, but that would theoretically play a very 
significant role in performance on the DVF task, is participant motivation and 
participant distractibility.  Motivation and distractibility are participant variables that 
are particularly significant to studies employing DVF paradigms because the task is 
challenging and requires sustained attention and motivation to accurately identify 
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targets presented to each hemisphere/VF.  Moreover, diminished motivation or 
distractibility would be more likely to negatively influence accuracy judgments for 
targets projected to the LVF/RH, because as was discussed earlier, RVF/LH linguistic 
targets are generally easier for most right-handed participants to identify relative to 
LVF linguistic targets (e.g., Banich, 1977; Rasmussen & Milner, 1977b).  Thus, if 
many of the individuals that comprised the previously-depressed diagnostic group in 
the present study were less motivated or more distracted when performing the task 
compared to individuals that comprised the never-depressed group, performance of 
the former group would likely be significantly compromised relative to the 
performance of the later group.  Notably, many of the previously depressed 
participants were recruited early on in the recruitment phase of the study, and 
recruitment began in the month of November shortly before the holiday season.  
Thus, it remains possible that many of the previously depressed participants were 
more distracted by thoughts of final exams and returning home for the holidays 
relative to the never-depressed participants, and therefore, were more distracted 
and/or less motivated to exert significant effort on a challenging cognitive task in the 
context of a university psychology experiment.  Although, this explanation is 
impossible to support empirically with the present study (because these variables 
weren’t measured), it may help to make some sense of this unexpected finding. 
One finding from the present study that was not explicitly predicted – but not 
entirely surprising - is the observed processing bias for valence-primed negative 
words across both diagnostic groups (this finding was supported by a significant 
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interaction between valence and prime-target relationship found with the ANOVA 
model that excluded participants with poor RH accuracy).  Thus, negative target 
words preceded by a related prime word were judged more accurately than negative 
targets preceded by an unrelated prime word.  There was not, however, a significant 
valence-priming advantage for positive targets, although the pattern of results for 
positive targets was consistent with a valence-priming advantage that would likely 
have been significant if the present study had more power.   
There are a number of viable explanations for the greater valence-priming 
advantage for negative words found in the present study.  Notably, for example, this 
finding is consistent with an extensive literature that documents the heightened 
overall salience of negatively toned information (e.g., Smith, Larsen, Chartrand, 
Cacioppo, Katafiasz, & Moran, 2006).   For example, research from non-clinical 
populations (e.g., individuals without a DSM-IV diagnosable disorder) has found 
evidence of a negative bias in the evaluations that people make (e.g., Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1984), information that people voluntarily attend to (e.g., Fiske, 1980; 
Graziano, Brothen, & Berscheid, 1980), and automatic, pre-conscious attentional 
processes (e.g., Hansen & Hansen, 1988; Ohman, Lundqvist, & Esteves, 2001; Pratto 
& John, 1991).  Furthermore, several researchers have argued that this processing 
bias with respect to negative information is very robust – i.e., that in many respects 
bad is stronger than good (e.g., Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001). 
One theoretical explanation that seems particularly compelling is the fact that natural 
selection pressures over the eons gave preference to individuals who weighted 
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negative information from the environment more heavily than positive information.  
By this account, the adverse consequences of failing to attend to and accurately 
process negative information (e.g., the presence of nearby predators) were greater 
than those involved in the failing to process positive information (the presence of a 
nearby food supply), such that those who accorded heightened salience to negatively 
toned information were more likely to survive, reproduce, and pass their genetic 
material on to subsequent generations.  Thus, after thousands of years of natural 
selection processes, human beings have evolved to more readily attend to negatively 
valent information in their environment (e.g., Cacioppo et al, 1997).  By this account, 
then, the present finding of a significantly greater priming advantage for negative 
words across diagnostic groups is not surprising, and might have been expected.   
In addition to addressing the unanticipated findings associated with 
participants’ divided visual field task performance (i.e., previous study findings were 
not replicated), it is also important to address the findings associated with the mood-
induction procedure used in the present study.  In short, there were no significant 
effects of the mood induction on any study variables of interest.  Notably, however, 
this procedure may not have produced a persistent sad mood state for either 
diagnostic group, inasmuch as final VAS (dysphoric mood) scores – obtained about 
15 minutes following the mood induction – were not significantly elevated above pre-
induction baseline scores.  Consequently, the present study’s non-significant findings 
for mood-priming on lateralized emotional processes may be a consequence of 
ineffective mood-priming rather than the absence of an appreciable effect of transient 
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sad mood states on these processes.  Unfortunately, the present study findings are 
consistent with both interpretations, and therefore, is unable to adequately address 
this important theoretical question regarding the significance of sad mood states to 
lateralized emotional processes, particularly in depression-vulnerable individuals.   
In regard to the effectiveness of the mood induction procedure for priming sad 
mood states, there are a couple of issues that warrant further discussion.  First, 
although the VAS scores for the present study suggested that the mood priming 
procedure was not sufficiently powerful to produce a sad mood state that endured 
across the last two blocks of DVF trials, the MAACL scores were more consistent 
with an enduring sad mood state because when mood primed previously-depressed 
and never-depressed participants were compared to sham induced never-depressed 
participants immediately following mood priming, and after the last two blocks of 
DVF trials, both mood primed groups showed significantly higher depression 
subscale (and residualized subscale) scores relative to sham induced never-depressed 
participants.  One interpretation of these mixed findings is that the two mood 
measures are tapping different aspects associated with a sad mood state.  In this 
regard, the MAACL assesses the number of negative and positive adjectives that a 
participant endorses to describe how they feel at that moment, whereas the VAS 
requires participants to mark how sad or not sad they feel in that moment on a 10 cm 
line.  Therefore, it is possible that the MAACL is tapping into more of the verbal 
processes (or even ruminative processes) associated with a transient sad mood state.  
Furthermore, because the MAACL also requires participants to think about positive 
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adjectives (and not endorsing them), it may also be assessing the lack of positive 
affect.  The VAS, however, may be assessing the participant’s rapid assessment of 
how they generally feel in that moment without tapping verbal processes that may be 
activated by a sad mood state, or assessing for the absence or presence of positive 
affect.  However, the implications of these possible differences – between the 
measures - for the present study is difficult to assess because they were not 
administered at completely overlapping time points, and therefore may also be 
measuring different aspects of mood state depending on when they were administered 
(e.g., before mood induction vs. after mood induction).   
Furthermore, perhaps a more parsimonious interpretation of the mixed 
findings associated with these two measures of mood state is that the VAS was better 
suited to assessing the persistence of a sad mood for the present study simply because 
it was administered on multiple occasions, and included an assessment prior to the 
mood induction procedure.  Consequently, the VAS provided a baseline assessment 
for a within-subjects comparison on the effectiveness of the induction procedure, and 
several post-mood priming assessments, which permitted the detection of a linear 
decline for the sad mood state.  The MAACL, however, was used in a between-
subjects comparison with the sham-induced never-depressed participants – as a 
control comparison - and was administered immediately following mood priming and 
after the final block of the DVF task.  In this regard, the VAS results for the present 
study suggested that the mood-priming procedure was not an adequate test of the 
significance of sad mood states on the lateralization of emotional processes, and 
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therefore, the non-significant findings associated with this manipulation in the present 
study should be interpreted with extreme caution and warrant further investigation.    
Because the VAS findings for the present study were consistent with a 
relatively rapid decay of the primed sad mood state, possible explanations for this 
finding, and whether it may generalize to other studies that have employed similar sad 
mood priming procedures warrants further discussion.  First, the present study is one 
of a limited number of studies that has used repeated (and multiple) assessments of 
mood state throughout the experiment to determine whether the primed sad mood 
persists; however, see Beevers & Carver, Ingram and colleagues, (1994), and Segal 
and colleagues (1999) for other studies that employed mood state assessment 
procedures that allowed for detection of decayed or deteriorated sad mood priming 
effects.  Although the aforementioned studies (Beevers & Carver; Ingram et al; Segal 
et al.) provided support for an enduring sad mood, the vast majority of studies have 
not employed mood state assessment procedures that enable detection of deteriorating 
mood priming effects.  Therefore, in light of the present study’s support for a decayed 
sad mood state with the VAS findings (before completion of the cognitive task), and 
the fact that most studies have not tested for this possibility, it raises questions as to 
why the mood induction procedure may not have produced a sufficiently lasting sad 
mood state in the present study.   
For example, was there something about the divided visual field task used in 
the present study that facilitated recovery from the primed sad mood state, or, even 
something unusual about the participants that made them resilient to mood priming 
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effects?  In this regard, it is worth pointing out that the task was challenging and 
required considerable sustained attention.  Therefore, one hypothesis is that the task 
was sufficiently distracting from ruminative thoughts to contribute to a fast recovery 
from the primed sad mood.  Alternatively, there is the possibility that this finding is a 
reflection of the transient nature of the primed sad mood state associated with 
frequently employed mood induction procedures that would otherwise have been 
observed in many of the other studies if they had assessed for decayed mood priming 
effects.  Unfortunately, until additional studies employ mood state assessment 
methodologies that test for possible decay effects (e.g., repeated assessments, 
assessment of mood after all cognitive tasks and/or measures have been completed), 
this question will remain largely unanswered.  However, the VAS findings in the 
present study raise the question as to whether these commonly employed mood 
priming procedures are sufficiently potent to reliably produce mood states that persist 
long enough to adequately assess the effect of sad mood states on cognitive processes.   
Lastly, findings associated with the full depression subscale of the MAACL 
suggested that sad mood priming initially produced greater global negative affect in 
previously depressed participants relative to never-depressed participants (albeit very 
transient), but not greater depressive affect because once the variance associated with 
hostility and anxiety was removed (e.g., the residualized depression subscale scores) 
there were no longer significant differences between the diagnostic groups.  
Therefore, this study’s findings suggest that sad mood priming may produce greater 
negative affect associated with anxiety and/or hostility in depression-experienced 
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individuals, but does not produce greater depressive affect in these individuals.  This 
finding is both novel – in that we are not aware of any other studies that have 
documented this finding with sad mood priming procedures – and interesting because 
it suggests that sad mood priming may at least initially produce greater negative 
arousal in depression-experienced individuals, but not greater depressive affect 
(which is usually associated with less arousal relative to anxiety and hostility).  
However, given that this finding was both unpredicted and novel, it warrants further 
investigation. 
As previously mentioned, this study was the first to simultaneously examine 
the role of state anxiety and a primed sad mood on emotional processing in 
previously-depressed and never-depressed participants using a divided visual field 
paradigm.  In essence, it represents an attempt to clarify the degree to which previous 
reports of an enduring right-hemispheric depressotypic verbal processing bias might 
be contingent on the experience of state dysphoria or state anxiety – a question of 
some significance because major theories (e.g., Beck, 1976) concerning the 
etiological roles of negatively biased cognition, and the degree to which such 
cognition is mood-state-dependent, are still being evaluated (e.g., Hedlund & Rude, 
1995; Ingram et al., 1994; Miranda & Persons, 1988)   Thus, given the significance of 
the aforementioned questions to better understanding depression vulnerability, and 
the fact that the present study was unable to address these questions for reasons 
already discussed, future research that examines the combined contributions of mood 
state, anxiety, and cognitive vulnerability to depression seems paramount.  Moreover, 
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because there were several limitations associated with the present study, several 
recommendations are also warranted.  
One of the major limitations associated with the present study may in fact be 
related to the sample size that was retained and included in the primary study 
analyses.  Although the number of participants recruited for each group in the present 
study was not appreciably smaller than that of previous studies from the same lab 
using the same divided visual field paradigm (e.g., Atchely et al., 2003, 2005), many 
participants in the present study demonstrated very poor accuracy on the DVF task 
(particularly for LVF/RH trials), and therefore, recruitment of much larger sample 
sizes seems to be necessary given that many participants may need to be excluded 
from the analyses.  Furthermore, given some of the other study limitations (discussed 
below), the study likely had less power for detecting reliable and statistically 
significant findings in the first place, and therefore, required additional participants.  
Thus, null findings associated with the present study should not be accepted and 
interpreted as indicative of what would be found in studies with larger sample sizes 
and greater statistical power. 
A second major limitation associated with the present study concerns the 
strategies used to help participants gain proficiency at performing the DVF task.  
First, although the present study included a practice session (consisting of 30 trials), 
and 4 practice trials at the beginning of each experimental block, many of the 
participants continued to demonstrate very poor accuracy rates for LVF/RH targets, 
and therefore, it appears as though they required additional practice.  Furthermore, the 
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feedback that participants received following each trial may have been stressful (and 
disheartening over time) for some of the participants (and especially for previously 
depressed individuals), and inadvertently contributed to their relatively poor accuracy 
rates, particularly for LVF/RH trials.  Thirdly, it was noted previously that some 
participants in the present study may have shifted their gaze slightly to the right (or 
even moved their eyes back and forth across the computer screen), and therefore, the 
strategies used in the present study to discourage eye movements and maintain 
fixation for the center of the screen (e.g., explicit verbal and visual instructions to 
maintain focus on the centrally presented fixation cross) were not particularly 
effective in the present study.  Moreover, the use of feedback after each trial as an 
implicit reminder to avoid eye movements (i.e., participants were informed that 
multiple incorrect responses were often a consequence of eye movements), may have 
actually had a detrimental effect on participants’ performance.   Thus, many of the 
strategies used in the present study to facilitate participant performance on the DVF 
task appeared to be ineffective, and in some cases, may have actually compromised 
performance. 
A third limitation of the present study concerns the selection of verbal stimuli 
used to assess lateralization of emotional processing. Because high- and low-arousal 
words were excluded from the wordlists – and there was evidence from previous 
studies that suggested high arousal negative words and low arousal positive words 
were the most salient for participants – overall accuracy rates, particularly in the RH, 
may have been inadvertently compromised.  Moreover, severely compromised 
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response accuracy in the RH for many participants led to their subsequent exclusion 
from further analyses, which significantly diminished the present study’s statistical 
power for detecting significant within and between-group differences, and increased 
the likelihood for Type II errors.  Thus, exclusion of the extreme arousal words – 
which were the most salient verbal stimuli - from the wordlists may have indirectly 
contributed to the present study’s relatively low statistical power by compromising 
participants’ ability to accurately judge targets, particularly when presented to the 
LVF/RH.   
Another important limitation associated with the present study concerns the 
mood manipulation and the mixed findings associated with it.  Because the MAACL 
was only administered post-mood induction, no baseline comparison was available 
for this measure.  This limitation was significant because the mood state measures 
were not consistent in their support for the effectiveness of the mood manipulation, 
and having a baseline measure for the MAACL would have resolved remaining 
questions regarding this issue.  Moreover, if the findings from the VAS characterized 
the effectiveness of the mood manipulation, then the mood induction procedure that 
was used may have limited the ability of the study to examine this important 
theoretical question regarding the effect of a sad mood state on the lateralization of 
emotional processing in depression-vulnerable individuals. 
Finally, recruitment of university students for all studies, but particularly for 
studies of clinically significant disorders such as major depression, limits the 
generalizability of study findings.  Therefore, even though all previously depressed 
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participants met DSM-IV criteria for a prior major depressive episode, they were still 
likely not fully representative of previously depressed individuals that would be 
found in other settings.  Furthermore, university students generally reflect a limited 
age range, such that the mode student is in their early 20s, and are different in other 
significant ways (e.g., education) that make them not entirely representative of the 
population. 
Given the limitations associated with the present study, several 
recommendations for future investigations in this area are warranted.  First, because 
the present study was likely under-powered for a variety of reasons, recruiting larger 
sample sizes for both participant groups - to compensate for the possibility that many 
participants may perform poorly on the DVF task - is a very important and relatively 
easily remedied recommendation.  Future studies that are adequately powered with 
larger sample sizes for both groups, for example, would help to illuminate whether 
many of the non-significant findings associated with the present study reflect inherent 
power issues associated with smaller sample sizes, or important contributions to the 
literature inasmuch as they might suggest that findings observed by previous studies 
may rely on specific methodologies that have not been explicitly identified previously 
(e.g., feedback after each trial may compromise performance) .   
Another recommendation that is equally important (if not more important) 
concerns the strategies used to help participants gain proficiency at performing the 
DVF task.  Given that many participants in the present study evidenced very poor 
accuracy for LVF/RH trials, additional practice with the task – prior to beginning the 
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experimental sessions – seems paramount.  For example, including at least two 
practice sessions prior to beginning the first experimental block would give 
participants twice the amount of practice – relative to the present study – and the 
opportunity to ask knowledgeable questions (based on their experience with the first 
practice session) and practice a second time before the actual experiment.  
Conversely, another strategy aimed at increasing participants’ comfort with the task 
would be to require all participants to gain proficiency (i.e., above chance accuracy 
judgments) at identifying LVF/RH targets before beginning the experimental sessions 
(although at some point participants who continued to evidence poor LVF/RH 
accuracy judgments would need to move forward with the actual experiment).  
Secondly, given the likelihood that the performance feedback is stressful (or least not 
helpful) for many participants (and this may be particularly true for previously 
depressed participants), eliminating the feedback after each trial is recommended.  
Finally, because participants may find it difficult to remain vigilant for eye 
movements throughout the DVF sessions, having a researcher stay in the room with 
them while they perform the DVF task, and periodically remind them to continue to 
fixate their eyes on the center of the screen (where the fixation cross was presented), 
may help to reduce the number of eye movements produced by participants during the 
task. 
An additional recommendation for future studies is to use verbal stimulus lists 
that include high- and low-arousal words, because exclusion of these words in the 
present study may have inadvertently contributed to the relatively poor LVF/RH 
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accuracy rates that were observed for many participants in the present study.  
Furthermore, it is recommended that positive and negative words be balanced for the 
arousal level associated with each, and that equal numbers of low, moderate, and high 
arousal words for both valences be included.  Experimentally manipulating the 
arousal level of the word stimuli by including equal numbers of high and low 
arousing words for each valence would allow for the exploration of the singular effect 
of valence – and the effect of arousal – without eliminating what are likely the most 
salient words (high arousing negative and low arousing positive words), and thereby 
reducing power to detect significant differences within subjects (e.g., valence priming 
advantage for negative and positive words) and between diagnostic groups.  
Moreover, if the arousal level of verbal stimuli contributes differentially to cognitive 
biases among the different diagnostic groups, then including verbal stimuli that 
possess the full range for the arousal dimension permits exploration of such 
possibilities. 
Another recommendation alluded to earlier, involves the assessment of mood 
priming procedures.  Although the present study represented a significant 
improvement over the vast majority of previous studies that have employed mood 
priming procedures to investigate the influence of sad mood states on cognitive 
vulnerability in depression, the omission of a baseline measure of the MAACL 
prohibited the unequivocal evaluation of the effectiveness of the mood induction 
procedure.  Therefore, it is recommended that future studies use repeated assessments 
and incorporate multiple measures of mood state as was done in the present study, but 
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also include a baseline assessment of mood state for all mood state measures that are 
used.  By including baseline assessments of all mood state measures, and repeated 
assessments of mood state, questions regarding the potency of mood priming 
procedures may become more conclusive. 
Finally, even though there were no observed effects of state anxiety on the 
lateralization of emotional processing in the present study, given that the study was 
likely underpowered because many participants were excluded from the analyses, and 
findings associated with the initial omnibus analysis are likely unreliable and difficult 
to interpret for reasons already discussed, it remains possible that there were more 
subtle effects of anxious symptomatology on emotional processing that the present 
study was unable to detect.  Thus, it is recommended that future studies continue to 
assess the possible role of state anxiety in the lateralization of emotional processing.  
Moreover, because depression and anxiety disorders are highly comorbid, future 
studies may also want to assess for these disorders (in addition to major depression) 
in order to determine whether more severe anxious symptomatology affects 
information processing biases in depression that are not observed with more transient 
anxious states. 
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